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ARTICLES
IS CONVICTION IRRELEVANT?
Elizabeth T. Lear*
The past five years have been witness to a revolution in federal
sentencing practice: indeterminate sentencing, dominated by discre-
tion and focused on the rehabilitative prospects of the offender, has
been replaced by guidelines infused with offense-based considera-
tions.I As sweeping as the change in sentencing procedure has
been, the system retains troubling aspects of the former regime.
The most controversial among these is the Guidelines' reliance on
unadjudicated conduct to determine proper punishment levels. 2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A. 1981, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1987, University of Michigan. I am deeply in-
debted to Francis Allen, Charles Collier, Daniel Freed, Kenwyn Fuller, Jerold Israel,
Andrew Kind, Marc Miller, Robert Moffat, Evan Roth, Kevin Reitz, Sharon Rush,
Stephen Schulhofer, Michael Seigel, and Christopher Slobogin for their insightful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this Article and to William Hazzard, Kathryn Love, Michael
Dupee, and James Holmes for their excellent and tireless research assistance. I am also
grateful to the University of Florida College of Law for supporting this research with
summer research appointments.
1. The indeterminate system vested the sentencing court with nearly absolute dis-
cretion to sentence within a range of appropriate punishment (for instance, 2 to 20
years) designated by statute. See infra Part I. In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act, which officially abandoned the aging indeterminate sentencing model for
the federal courts. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988
& Supp. III 1991); 28 U.S.C., §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (referred to through-
out this Article as the "Act"). The Act eliminated parole and created the United States
Sentencing Commission to design a guidelines system. In November 1987, the United
States Sentencing Guidelines became law. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (referred to
throughout this Article as the "Guidelines").
2. The Guidelines as a whole were greeted with extreme hostility by the federal
bench, provoking many district courts and one court of appeals to declare the entire
enterprise unconstitutional. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT
11 (1990) (documenting that 200 judges declared the Guidelines unconstitutional within
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the first year of operation). Not until the Supreme Court definitively upheld the Com-
mission's constitutionality in United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), did the
lower courts get down to the business of imposing the Guidelines' sentences. See Ron-
ald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on the
Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 2, 23-40 (1991) (analyzing the delega-
tion doctrine challenge in Mistretta).
Commentary about all aspects of the Guidelines has been extensive. See Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1685 n.10 (1992) (listing critical reviews
of the Guidelines by "federal judges, scholars and others"). To date, four law review
symposium issues have been dedicated, at least in part, to Guidelines issues: Sympo-
sium, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Symposium, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771 (1992);
Symposium, Making Sense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 563 (1992); Symposium, Punishment, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Symposium,
Symposium on Federal Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 99 (1993).
The Guidelines' extensive reliance on unadjudicated conduct, or "real" factors,
permeates the system and has proven particularly controversial. Numerous scholars,judges, and practitioners have explored the rationale and consequences of this decision.
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1988) (reviewing the Commis-
sion's reasons for preferring a real offense system); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of
Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 185-225,
228-30 (1991) (contending that the Guidelines have not eliminated disparity because
real factors may be manipulated, that the relevant conduct provisions violate due pro-
cess by requiring judges to sentence for uncharged or unproven criminal acts, and rec-
ommending that an "offense-of-conviction model . . . replace the modified real offense
system adopted by the Sentencing Commission"); Susan N. Herman, The Tail That
Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 323-43 (1992) (arguing that real
factors significantly influencing the length of a sentence must be moved from the sen-
tencing hearing to trial for proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Ilene H. Nagel, Structur-
ing Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 883, 925 n.228 (1990) (describing reasons for relying on modified real
offense model); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 544-61 (1992) (adding to their earlier study of the
extent of Guidelines compliance); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentenc-
ing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833,
848-50 (1992) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process] (re-
sponding to Heaney's criticism and rejecting Heaney's version of an offense-of-convic-
tion model); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231,
278-86 (1989) (assessing the extent to which prosecutors are manipulating sentences (by
withholding evidence of real conduct) through charge bargaining); William W. Wilkins,
Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 497-520 (1990) (discussing the decision and describing
the key provision incorporating the real offense concept); Note, An Argument for Con-
frontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1895-98
(1992) (contending that defendants should enjoy a right to confrontation at sentencing
given the impact of real factors on the ultimate sentence); Richard Husseini, Note, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence as the Burden
of Proof, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1387, 1407-11 (1990) (arguing that the importance of
factual determinations of real factors mandates a higher burden of proof at sentencing);
see also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45
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This approach is a variation on "real offense" sentencing, 3 which
severs the punishment inquiry from the offense of conviction, focus-
ing instead on an offender's "actual" conduct. Under the Guide-
lines, the "real offense" often encompasses acts prohibited by
criminal statute that have never been the subject of a formal convic-
tion. This Article challenges the constitutionality of treating such
unconvicted criminal conduct 4  as an aggravating factor at
sentencing.'
Punishment for nonconviction offenses, whether the result of
an acquittal, a dismissed count, or conduct never charged, forms
one of the mainstays of the fledgling federal system. 6 For example,
under the Guidelines, a defendant convicted of possession with in-
tent to distribute two kilograms of cocaine, but acquitted of a three-
kilogram count, may be sentenced as if the acquittal never oc-
STAN. L. REV. 523, 547-65 (1993) (discussing policy reasons for rejecting real offense
sentencing, focusing primarily on state systems); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of
Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 757-72 (1980) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Due Process
of Sentencing] (discussing the difficulties in relying on real offense model to control
prosecutorial power at sentencing); Michael H. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1564-85
(1981) (rejecting real offense sentencing on constitutional and policy grounds before the
adoption of the Guidelines); Michael Tonry & John C. Coffee, Jr., Enforcing Sentencing
Guidelines: Plea Bargaining and Review Mechanisms, in THE SENTENCING COMMIS-
SION AND ITS GUIDELINES 142, 152-63 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987) (review-
ing the real offense model in the context of guidelines systems in general).
3. Real offense sentencing is discussed in detail infra subpart I.B. The Guidelines
are often described as a "modified" real offense system. The system is modified in that
the judge initially focuses on the offense of conviction, adjusting later for "real" factors,
and because the Guidelines exclude from consideration some information (such as em-
ployment history) that real offense regimes have historically considered relevant. See
Breyer, supra note 2, at 8-12 (reviewing the Commission's reasons for preferring a ver-
sion of real offense sentencing); Nagel, supra note 2, at 925 n.228 (describing reasons for
relying on a "modified" real offense model).
4. The terms "nonconviction offense," "unconvicted criminal conduct,"
"unadjudicated crime," and "nonconviction crime" are used interchangeably to refer to
conduct that has never been the subject of a conviction but is defined as criminal by
statute. The terms "acquittal conduct" and "acquittal offense" refer to offense conduct
that is the subject of a count for which a defendant has been acquitted. The practice of
basing punishment on nonconviction offenses is referred to as "nonconviction offense
sentencing," which is a subset of real offense sentencing, and is discussed in detail infra
Part I.
5. This Article considers only the constitutionality of treating unadjudicated
crimes as sentencing factors. It makes no attempt to address the issues surrounding the
incorporation of other bad, but not specifically criminal, acts at sentencing.
6. The Chairman of the Sentencing Commission explained in a 1990 article that
the relevant conduct provisions, by far the most expansive method of incorporating
nonconviction offenses into the sentencing calculus, form the "cornerstone" of the
Guidelines system. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 2, at 496.
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curred. 7 Though the 2-kilogram conviction alone theoretically dic-
tates a sentence between 78 and 97 months, the Guidelines
categorize the 3-kilogram acquittal offense as occurring within "the
same course of conduct," thus increasing the sentencing range to
121 to 151 months.8 Similarly, an offender who pleads guilty to one
count of theft in exchange for the dismissal of a second theft charge
may be sentenced to the identical term he would have received had
he pled guilty to both.9 And a conviction for a single count of
7. United States v. Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d 372, 372-73 (11 th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the Government's failure to prove all the elements of the three-kilogram offense, for
which the jury acquitted the defendant, did not preclude the sentencing judge from
considering the facts underlying the acquittal offense if those facts were established by a
preponderance of the evidence); see also United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d 1238, 1243
(11 th Cir. 1991) (holding that, when the jury convicted the defendant on two cocaine
distribution counts and acquitted on a conspiracy charge, the sentencing judge could
include the drug quantity involved in the acquittal offense because "an acquittal based
on a reasonable doubt standard should not preclude a contrary finding using the pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard at sentencing); United States v. Rodriguez-Gon-
zalez, 899 F.2d 177, 180-82 (2d Cir.) (allowing the defendant's sentence for various
narcotics offenses to be enhanced for carrying a firearm during the crimes despite the
jury's not guilty verdict on a charge of using and possessing a firearm), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 127 (1990); United States v. Dawn, 897 F.2d 1444, 1449-50 (8th Cir.) (holding
that a jury acquittal on a charge of using a firearm during a bank robbery "does not
undermine the fact that a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that
a firearm was used during the robbery" for which the defendants were convicted and
allowing the firearm to be considered at sentencing), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 389 (1990);
United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1989) (allowing the defendant's
sentence for cocaine possession to be enhanced for possession of a firearm despite the
jury's acquittal of the defendant on the same weapons possession charge); United States
v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1989) (allowing handgun possession
acquittal to be considered in sentencing on cocaine distribution counts).
Not every sentence under the Guidelines that relies in part on evidence of a non-
conviction offense is equivalent to the sentence the defendant would have received had
he been convicted of the nonconviction offense. In some cases, the statutory maximum
for the offense of conviction acts as a ceiling, thus limiting the impact of the nonconvic-
tion offense on the sentence.
8. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Rivera-Lopez does not specify the exact sen-
tence imposed by the district court. According to the drug tables set forth in U.S.S.G.,
supra note 1, § 2D 1. 1(c), a finding that 2 kilograms of cocaine were involved in the
offense yields a "base offense level" of 28, while a finding of 5 kilograms yields a base
level of 32, assuming a Guidelines Criminal History score of Category I.
9. United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1211-14 (11th Cir. 1989) (agree-
ment to drop I count charging 18 instances of theft in exchange for the defendant's plea
of guilty to another count alleging only 1 act of theft requires a Guidelines sentence
based upon the entire amount of money allegedly stolen during all thefts originally
charged in the indictment, resulting in the identical sentence that the defendant would
have received had he been convicted of both counts), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1083 (1990);
see also United States v. Camuti, 950 F.2d 72, 74 (1st Cir. 1991) (conduct involved in
two counts dropped as a result of a plea bargain considered in sentencing for the count
under which the defendant pleaded guilty); United States v. Salmon, 948 F.2d 776, 778
(D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Plea agreements ...calling for the dismissal of counts, will not
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money laundering may provoke punishment not only for the con-
viction offense but for any other episodes of money laundering in
which the defendant allegedly engaged, regardless of the govern-
ment's failure to include these episodes in the indictment.' 0
Constitutional challenges to punishment for nonconviction of-
fenses have met with consistent rebuffs in the federal courts. With
the exception of the Ninth Circuit, I" the courts of appeals have per-
ceived no constitutional impediment to "counting" nonconviction
offenses at sentencing.12 After pointing out that the federal courts
necessarily result in a reduced sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines."); United
States v. Ruelas-Armenta, 684 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-52 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (consideration
of conduct involved in charges dropped as a result of plea bargain does not destroy all
incentives to enter plea bargains).
10. See United States v. Stevenson, No. 89-50443, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 279, at
*2 (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 1992) (calculating sentence based on estimate of $139,755 laundered
by the defendant where indictment charged S 54,794 and the count of conviction was for
$16,104); see also United States v. Andrews, 948 F.2d 448, 448-50 (8th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (using the defendant's admitted participation in 5 uncharged bank robberies to
increase sentence for aiding and abetting a single armed bank robbery and using a fire-
arm in that crime, which resulted in a 90-month sentence when sentencing range for
crime of conviction was 37-46 months).
11. The Ninth Circuit alone excludes from the Guidelines sentencing score real
conduct necessarily rejected by the jury in acquittal cases. See United States v. Brady,
928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to allow the sentencing judge to punish the
defendant for conduct "that the jury has necessarily rejected by its judgment of acquit-
tal"). The Eighth Circuit flirted briefly with the notion that the Commission lacked
statutory authority to require punishment for some nonconviction offenses pursuant to
the relevant conduct provisions. United States v. Galloway, 943 F.2d 897, 899-905 (8th
Cir.), vacated and reh'g granted, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27316 (8th Cir. 1991) (en
banc), rev'd, 976 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1420
(1993). The opinion, however, was quickly recalled pursuant to a decision to review the
question en banc. The court reversed its position in the later decision, holding that not
only were the nonconviction offense provisions statutorily authorized, but also that the
provisions did not violate the constitutional rights to indictment, jury trial, and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Galloway, 976 F.2d at 422, 425.
The district courts have been slightly more receptive to constitutional challenges.
Judge Eisele's opinion in United States v. Clark, 792 F. Supp. 637, 650 (E.D. Ark.
1992), rejecting the use of uncharged criminal conduct as a sentencing factor on Fifth
and Sixth Amendment grounds, is particularly interesting in that he was the author of
the district court opinion in Galloway in which he also rejected the use of uncharged
conduct in that case on constitutional grounds. See Galloway, 943 F.2d at 898-99
(quoting Judge Eisele's district court opinion in Galloway).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d 372, 372-73 (11th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam) (rejecting a challenge that the use of acquittal conduct at sentencing is
contrary to the foundation of our judicial system, is a denial of due process, and usurps
the jury's role by noting that the use of acquittal conduct in sentencing had already been
approved in prior decisions); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177,
179-82 (2d Cir.) (allowing the use of acquittal conduct over a double jeopardy challenge
because the Guidelines did not change the practice as established in pre-Guidelines
cases and over a due process challenge because it is well established "that disputed
sentencing factors need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence to satisfy due
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have incorporated nfonconviction offenses into punishment decisions
for nearly half a century,' 3 the cases explain that the defendant op-
erates under a misconception: the defendant is not actually pun-
ished for the nonconviction offense conduct; the sentence for the
conviction offense is merely "enhanced" as a result of that con-
duct. 14 Based on this historical distinction between punishment and
process"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1990); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13,
17 (1st Cir. 1989) (allowing the use of acquittal conduct in sentencing because the jury's
not guilty verdict did not mean that the conduct was "clearly improbable" but "simply
means that the government did not meet its considerable burden under the reasonable
doubt standard"); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1989) (dismissing
a due process challenge to the use of acquittal conduct at sentencing because it was
based on the "flawed" assumption that the acquittal established the defendant's inno-
cence); United States v. Restrepo, 884 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1989) (over an argu-
ment that the Guidelines impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show no connection between the firearm and the offense of conviction, the court allowed
enhancement for uncharged firearms possession because the Guidelines do not require
that any connection at all be shown, but merely require that the firearm be possessed
during the offense of conviction); United States v. McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095, 1098 (6th
Cir. 1989) (allowing sentence enhancement for uncharged firearms possession over a
due process challenge that the enhancement violated the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right because "[n]ot all factors that bear on punishment need to be proven before a
jury"); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1989) (allowing the
use of acquittal conduct at sentencing despite the argument that its use overrode the
jury's factual determination because the acquittal conduct was not used to punish for
the acquittal offense, "but to justify the heavier penalties for the offenses for which
[defendant] was convicted"); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1989)
(affirming the use of acquittal conduct in sentencing over a challenge suggesting such
use was inconsistent with the Guidelines by noting its use in pre-Guidelines cases and
interpreting the Guidelines to allow that practice to continue).
13. The Supreme Court officially upheld the use of uncharged criminal conduct to
enhance a sentence against a Confrontation Clause challenge in 1949. Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949). Although the Court has never reviewed the use of
acquittal conduct at sentencing, many courts of appeals upheld such enhancements well
before the advent of the Guidelines. See United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d
Cir.) (noting that any information may be used that gives the sentencing court "a more
complete and true picture" of the defendant, specifically including "other crimes for
which the defendant was neither tried nor convicted, and crimes charged that resulted
in acquittal"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987); United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309,
314 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972) (hold-
ing that the sentencing judge "could properly refer to the evidence introduced with
respect to crimes of which defendant was acquitted"). Challenges to Guidelines
sentences based upon unconvicted criminal conduct have more often than not been
greeted with the point that this aspect of the Guidelines is merely a codification of the
traditional practice in federal sentencing. See United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 609
(3d Cir. 1989) ("Before the guidelines were promulgated, a court was permitted to con-
sider evidence on counts of which a defendant was acquitted in sentencing the defendant
.... [T]he guidelines ... indicate that the Commission intended to permit sentencing
courts to continue to consider such information ...."); United States v. Mocciola, 891
F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Ryan with approval).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 457 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting
that the defendant's argument "seeks to blur the distinction among a sentence, sentence
1184
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enhancement, the courts have issued a series of astonishing state-
ments, chief among them that "[a] verdict of acquittal demonstrates
only a lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not necessar-
ily establish the defendant's innocence" for sentencing purposes.' 5
Tradition is no substitute for constitutionality; the steadfast-
ness with which the courts have proclaimed the constitutionality of
nonconviction offense sentencing should not deter its re-examina-
tion. 16 This Article rejects the idea that a label attached to time
spent in jail as a result of specific unconvicted criminal conduct is
dispositive of the constitutional question. Rather, this Article is
premised on the notion that an incremental increase in a sentence,
attributable to an offense for which a defendant has never been con-
victed, is not a figment of a defendant's imagination. Whether one
calls it "enhancement" or "punishment," a longer sentence remains
a serious restriction on an offender's actual freedom. It is the con-
stitutionality of this restriction, not its semantic classification, to
which this Article is addressed.
The use of nonconviction offenses to increase punishment at
sentencing is at odds with the central role of the grand and petit
juries in the constitutional plan for the administration of justice.
The Constitution places the jury at the heart of the criminal justice
system as the "fundamental guarantor of individual liberty."' 7
Practice under the Guidelines graphically illustrates the extent to
which nonconviction offense sentencing emasculates the jury sys-
tem's ability to control potential executive and judicial abuse of the
criminal sanction. Due to its demonstrable incompatibility with the
constitutional role of the jury, nonconviction offense sentencing,
and the flawed due process theory on which it is premised, must be
rejected.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the adoption of the
Guidelines model, discusses the decision to rely on nonconviction
crimes at sentencing, and illustrates the operation of principal pro-
enhancement, and definition of an offense"); Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 17 (noting that the
defendant's argument "misperceives the distinction between a sentence and a sentence
enhancement"); Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d at 749 ("The sentencing court was not relying
on facts disclosed at trial to punish the defendant for the extraneous offense, but to
justify the heavier penalties for the offenses for which he was convicted.").
15. Isom, 886 F.2d at 738.
16. Eg., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (reversing at least half
a century of educational practices pursuant to the "separate but equal" doctrine upheld
in Plessy v.. Ferguson, 163 U.5. 537 (1896)).
17. SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 34 (1990).
Unless otherwise specified, references to the jury or jury system encompass both the
grand and petit juries in the federal system.
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visions by which nonconviction offenses are incorporated into the
Guidelines scoring process. Part II examines Supreme Court and
courts of appeals cases rejecting constitutional challenges to punish-
ment for unconvicted criminal conduct.
Part III argues that the prevailing due process analysis of non-
conviction offense sentencing must be rejected, not as a result of any
change in sentencing philosophy, but because it was wrong in the
first instance. Using the Guidelines as a paradigm for systems em-
bracing nonconviction offense sentencing, Part III demonstrates the
disruptive effect punishment absent conviction has upon the struc-
ture and integrity of the criminal justice system through the classic
jury trial model. The Article concludes that sentencing factors en-
compassing conduct separately proscribed by criminal statute must
be excised from the Guidelines system as unconstitutional.
I. THE NONCONVICTION OFFENSE AS A SENTENCING FACTOR
UNDER THE GUIDELINES
A. The Creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
For the better part of this century, the federal system, like that
of the states, operated under the rubric of the indeterminate sen-
tence.' Premised on the notion that crime was "a moral disease,"
the diagnosis and cure of which were properly delegated to the "ex-
perts" in the criminal justice and correctional fields, this approach
elevated reformation to the "supreme aim of prison discipline."' 19
To aid officials in their efforts to rehabilitate, legislatures passed
criminal statutes with open-ended punishments, vesting judges with
broad discretion to assess a criminal's prospects for rehabilitation
and to sentence him accordingly. 20 For example, in the federal sys-
tem, the Controlled Substances Act allows the sentencing judge to
18. Commissioner Nagel traces the origin of indeterminate sentencing in the
United States to an 1870 Declaration of Principles by the National Congress of Prisons
adopting reform as the guiding principle of prison discipline. See Nagel, supra note 2,
at 893-94. By the time Congress officially adopted an indeterminate system in 1910,
roughly half of the states had already embraced the rehabilitative approach. Id. at 894.
19. Nagel, supra note 2, at 893 n.62 (citing AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N,
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF PRISONS AND REFORMATORY DiscI-
PLINE (1870)).
20. Having elevated reform to the overriding aim of imprisonment, the reformers
logically "reasoned that the prisoner should be sentenced until he or she had re-
formed-which was by definition an indeterminate time." Id. at 893-94. After em-
bracing the rehabilitative spirit, legislatures delegated sentencing responsibility to courts
and prison authorities "with a vengeance." Id. at 894.
1186 [Vol. 40:1179
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set punishment anywhere from ten years to life in prison. 21 Other
statutes, like the federal law prohibiting bank robbery, merely desig-
nate the maximum terms for which an offender might be consigned
to prison. 2
2
The indeterminate system in the federal courts left the initial
punishment choice entirely to the considered judgment of the trial
judge. To aid her in this decision, probation officers were called
upon to develop presentencing reports detailing:
any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information
about his characteristics, his financial condition and the circum-
stances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sen-
tence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of
the defendant, and such other information as may be required by
the court. 23
This structure provided an environment in which real offense sen-
tencing flourished with the inquiry extending well beyond the cir-
cumstances of the crime of conviction to include contemporaneous
acts of alleged criminality as well as those from the distant past.24
21. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The statute makes it unlawful "to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, a controlled substance." Id. § 841(a). For schedule I and II narcotic
drugs, the judge can sentence up to 20 years for the first offense and 30 years for the
second offense. Id. § 841(b)(1)(C). For schedule III items and nonnarcotic drugs, the
sentence can be up to 5 years for the first and 10 years for the second offense. Id.
§ 841(b)(1)(D).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1988). The statute authorizes a sentence of not more than
20 years or a fine of not more than $5000, or both.
23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). The Federal Probation Act of 1925 provided for
officers to assist judges in obtaining information for sentencing. This legislation made
no provision for formal reports. It was not until 1946 that the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure formalized the content of the presentence report. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
In a separate statute, Congress further provided that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on
the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person con-
victed of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 3577, 84 Stat. 922, 951 (1970) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3577
(1982), later incorporated into the Act as 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988)).
Rule 32 was substantially revised in connection with the passage of the Act. For
an enlightening discussion of the impact of these revisions and the importance of factual
findings in the presentence report under the Guidelines, see generally Keith A. Findley
& Meredith J. Ross, Comment, Access, Accuracy and Fairness: The Federal Presentence
Investigation Report Under Julian and the Sentencing Guidelines, 1989 Wis. L. REV.
837.
24. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), discussed infra notes 137-53 and
accompanying text, provides one of the best illustrations of the breadth of information
incorporated into the sentencing decision in the name of rehabilitation. In Williams,
the Supreme Court upheld a death penalty sentence based on, inter alia, accusations in
a presentence report that the defendant had committed some 30 uncharged burglaries
and had a "morbid sexuality." 337 U.S. at 244. The Court declined to restrict the
UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1179
Federal sentencing under this system proceeded largely unregu-
lated. Courts of appeals declined to require sentencing opinions2
and turned their collective backs on challenges to trial courts'
choices of sentence length. 26 Once sentenced, the defendant entered
yet another realm of discretionary decision making-that of correc-
tions officials responsible for assessing whether the prisoner's re-
form might warrant an early release. 27
Given the extreme level of discretion placed in the hands of a
single judge, it should have come as no surprise that offenders con-
sentencing judge's consideration to information discerned at trial because such a restric-
tion "would hinder if not preclude all courts-state and federal-from making progres-
sive efforts to improve the administration of criminal justice." Id. at 251. For a
fascinating and detailed account of the actual information considered by the trial court
in the Williams case, see Reitz, supra note 2, at 528-31.
Under the federal indeterminate system, the impact of allegations contained in the
presentence report extended well beyond the sentencing phase. Because the United
States Parole Commission relied on the report to categorize defendants for security pur-
poses and determine parole release dates, inaccuracies often had devastating conse-
quences. See Findley & Ross, supra note 23, at 837-38.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Granados, 962 F.2d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456, 1463-65 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 396
(1990); United States v. Castillo-Roman, 774 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[A]
sentencing court is not required to enunciate the reasons underlying its decision.").
26. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 507 F.2d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 1974) (noting
the "accepted principle that a federal trial judge has wide discretion in determining
what sentence to impose on a convicted person"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975);
Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253, 263 (5th Cir. 1968) ("It is elementary that
sentencing is discretionary with the trial judge, and he did not abuse his discretion by
fixing punishment within the statutory limits."), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969).
Sentencing judges took the courts of appeals at their word. See, e.g., United States
v. Lowery, 335 F. Supp. 519, 521 (D.D.C. 1971) (claiming that "in matters relating to
sentencing the trial court has virtually absolute, if not unfettered discretion" and that
"[i]t is clear that absent a manifest abuse of discretion, and provided the trial judge
complies with the applicable statute, his discretion in sentencing cannot be infringed
upon").
27. Typically, parole authorities retained the discretion to release a "rehabilitated"
prisoner at any time after one-third of his sentence had been served or after serving 10
years of a life sentence or of a sentence over 30 years. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976) (re-
pealed by Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2027 (1984)).
For many years, parole decisions were considered discretionary and hence not sub-
ject to due process restraints. See 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1234-41
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). The United States Parole Commission adopted guide-
lines in 1974 to inject some consistency into the system. Id. at 1235. Even then, a
prisoner was deemed by the court to have only the most limited procedural due process
right to accuracy at the parole release determination stage. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S.
78, 88 n.9 (1976); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407-12 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971). For a critical review of the Court's due process analysis
in the prison context, see generally Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty. The Procedural
Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV.
482 (1984).
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victed of similar crimes received widely disparate sentences.28  A
study of the Second Circuit, for example, disclosed that offenders
with identical criminal histories convicted of extortion might re-
ceive a sentence of anywhere between three and twenty years, de-
pending upon the sentencing judge. 29 A particularly troubling
aspect of the system was the suspicious tendency for minority of-
fenders to receive longer prison terms than their white counter-
parts.30 The high rate of recidivism observed by the public also
proved problematic. 31 By most accounts, the rehabilitative model
had failed. 32
28. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-50 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3224-33; MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER 12-25 (1972) (offering personal anecdotes to demonstrate sentencing
disparities and concluding that the indeterminate system resulted in the loss of vital
checks and balances on judicial power); RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR
REFORM 118-23 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983). Even early in the life of the inde-
terminate system, researchers documented startling disparities in sentence length
among similar offenders. See, e.g., Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual Differences in
the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933).
29. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 28, at 41-43, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3224-26 (citing ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIR-
CUIT SENTENCING STUDY, A REPORT TO THE JUDGES (1974) (reporting the results of
a series of hypothetical cases submitted to judges)).
30. See Joseph C. Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE
121, 121-25 (1975); Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1603-41 (1988).
31. See Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Re-
form, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (1974) (concluding that prison reform programs to
reduce recidivism have failed); James Robison & Gerald Smith, The Effectiveness of
Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67, 80 (1971) (reporting a California
study finding "no evidence to support any program's claim of superior rehabilitative
efficacy").
32. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 1-59
(1981). S. REP. No. 225 sums up as follows:
At present, the concepts of indeterminate sentencing and parole release
depend for their justification exclusively upon this model of "coercive"
rehabilitation-the theory of correction that ties prison release dates to
the successful completion of certain vocational, educational, and counsel-
ing programs within the prisons.
Recent studies suggest that this approach has failed, and most sen-
tencing judges as well as the Parole Commission agree that the rehabilita-
tion model is not an appropriate basis for sentencing decisions. We know
too little about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a
routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a particu-
lar prisoner has been rehabilitated.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 28, at 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223 (foot-
notes omitted).
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A series of sentencing reform attempts3 3 culminated with the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 34 which eliminated parole,3 5 cre-
ated the United States Sentencing Commission to design guidelines
for federal courts, 36 and provided for appellate review of
sentencesA7 By shifting to this determinate model, Congress hoped
to ease public confusion regarding sentence lengths,38 reduce un-
warranted disparity among defendants convicted of similar
crimes,39 and infuse sentences with a sense of proportionality. 4°
Although Congress declined to embrace a particular punishment
philosophy, the legislation clearly rejects rehabilitation as a legiti-
mate goal of incarceration. 41 The Act specifically excludes reliance
33. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 899 n.95, 899-900 (discussing the several congres-
sional attempts at reform that led to the Act).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988
& Supp. I 1990). A careful and detailed explanation of the legislation may be found in
Nagel, supra note 2, at 899-906.
35. See Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No.98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2008-09 (1984)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (1988)); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1,
pt. A, intro. cmt. at 1.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
38. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. at 2.
39. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 28, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3221; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988) (explaining the "need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct"); Breyer, supra note 2, at 4-5.
40. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. at 2.
41. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C § 994(k) (1988) (requiring that the Guidelines reflect "the
inappropriateness of imposing . . . imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitation.")
(emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 28, at 40, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223.
Though Congress quite clearly rejected the rehabilitative model, it declined to em-
brace any particular philosophy of punishment. Instead, it charged the Commission
with the "establish[ment of] sentencing policies and practices ... that ... assure the
meeting of the purposes of sentencing" set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988), which
lists the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punish-
ment, and rehabilitation. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (1988). After encountering substan-
tial disagreement among its members, the Commission also eschewed the adoption of a
particular theory of punishment. The Commission rejected the "just deserts" approach
advocated by Andrew von Hirsch because, according to Commissioner Breyer, attempt-
ing to rank harms in a coherent way was deemed too subjective. Breyer, supra note 2,
at 15-16. Similarly, the Commission rejected a "crime control" model combining deter-
rence and incapacitation values because of a lack of evidence demonstrating that small
variations in punishment would have any deterrent effect. Id. at 16-17. Commissioner
Nagel's explanation for the failure to adopt a single theory suggests that the statutory
mandate implicitly rejected a pure just deserts theory by using the term "just punish-
ment" in its goals section. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 915-16. In addition, she explains
that the Commission originally attempted to develop two sets of guidelines-one based
on a just deserts theory, the other on the crime control model. The crime control draft
was eventually abandoned due to external constraints such as data availability com-
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on troubling offender characteristics such as race and gender 42 and
requires the Guidelines to "reflect the general inappropriateness of
considering" a whole host of other offender characteristics uni-
formly relied on by the rehabilitative model. 43
After several drafts and extensive comment, 44 the Commission
produced a daunting set of sentencing guidelines45 for the more
than 1000 crimes in the federal system. 46 A user must engage in an
elaborate scoring process to determine the sentence in a given case.
Starting with the "base level" score for the offense of conviction, the
bined with the time pressure in the statute (the Commission only had two years to
present its guidelines to Congress). Thus only one draft was produced in the spring of
1986-the model based on the just deserts approach. This draft encountered severe and
widespread criticism. It was this response that apparently convinced the Commission
to abandon that approach. See id. at 918-20.
Ultimately, the Commission turned to "typical" past practice to develop a general
governing rationale for choices regarding sentence type and length. Id. at 922-24 (ar-
ticulating the agreement reached after experimenting with two other drafts). According
to the Commission, this decision "as a practical matter" rendered the choice between
competing philosophies "unnecessary because in most sentencing decisions the applica-
tion of either philosophy will produce the same or similar results." U.S.S.G., supra note
1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. at 3.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988) ("The Commission shall assure that the
[G]uidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national ori-
gin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders.").
43. When recommending a term of imprisonment, the Commission was admon-
ished to design guidelines reflecting "the general inappropriateness of considering the
education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and
community ties of the defendant." Id. § 994(e) (1988).
44. Nagel, supra note 2, at 914-25.
45. The 1993 edition of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual exceeds 800
pages.
46. Nagel, supra note 2, at 914. Commissioner Breyer estimates the number of
federal criminal statutes at only 688. Breyer, supra note 2, at 3. In response to criticism
that the Guidelines scoring process is too complex and should have more closely resem-
bled one of the state systems, Commissioner Breyer suggested that the scope of the
federal criminal code justifies the difference in approach and complexity of the federal
system. Id. at 3-4. According to Professor Marc Miller, this difference does not ade-
quately excuse the controversial 43-level grid system. Miller points out that the
"number of possible crimes says far less than the number of different kinds of crimes
that arise frequently" and notes that "over eighty percent of the federal case load is
accounted for by a fairly short list of offenses." He suggests that a simpler, more in-
formative grid would have been possible and preferable. Marc Miller, True Grid: Re-
vealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 587, 599-600 (1992).
The variety of actions deemed criminal by federal statute is astounding. A review
of Title 18 reveals that misappropriation of the "4-H Club emblem" and misappropria-
tion of the character "Smokey [the] Bear" are both federal criminal offenses. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 707, 711 (1988). Both of these crimes are currently classified as misdemeanors (and
are therefore not covered by the Guidelines), but given the reigning "get tough on
crime" mentality, it may only be a matter of time before they are elevated to felony
status.
UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1179
user adds or subtracts levels depending on the presence or absence
of aggravating and mitigating factors. Such factors may include, for
example, the defendant's "role in the offense," '47 the total weight of
drugs sold or attempted to be sold,48 the vulnerability of the vic-
tim, 49 or the use of a weapon. 50 Once a "base offense level" is estab-
lished, the user derives a score for the defendant's criminal
history.5' These scores are plotted on a 258-box grid; the point at
which they intersect provides the presumptive sentencing range. A
limited right to depart exists should a judge determine that factors
"not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Com-
mission" exist in a specific case.52
B. Real Offense Sentencing Under the Guidelines
Perhaps the Commission's most critical, and disturbing, deci-
sion when determining the structure and content of the Guidelines
sentences was to prefer a "real offense" to a "charge offense" sen-
tencing model.5 3 A charge or "conviction-offense" system ties pun-
47. U.S.S.G. supra note 1, § 3Bi.l(a)-(c).
48. Id. § 2D1.(a)(3), (c).
49. Id. § 3A1.i.
50. In several sections, the Guidelines add levels to the base offense score for the
use of a firearm during the crime. See, e.g., id. § 2A4. I(b)(3) (kidnapping, abduction,
unlawful restraint-two levels added); id. § 2B2.1(b)(3) (burglary and trespass-two
levels added); id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)-(C) (robbery-if firearm is "discharged," seven
levels added; if "used," six levels added; if "brandished," five levels added).
51. Id. §§ 4Al.l-.3.
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (trial court retains right to "depart" in certain
situations). See also U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K2.0, which sets forth the Commission's
views on the appropriateness of using certain information as the basis for departure.
The proper use of the departure power and the Commission's seemingly wholesale
rejection of individual factors as legitimate basis for departure, see id. § 5H 1.1, has
generated extensive comment. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 2, at 1715, 1738 (criticizing
Chapter 5H as inconsistent with the statutory mandate of the Act and recommending
that circuit courts entertain challenges to failures to depart); David Yellen, Appellate
Review of Refusals to Depart, I FED. SENTENCING REP. 264, 265 (1988).
53. According to Professor Michael Tonry, the Federal Commission is the only
sentencing commission in the United States to reject a charge offense model. See
Michael Tonry, Salvaging the Sentencing Guidelines in Seven Easy Steps, 4 FED. SEN-
TENCING REP. 355, 356-57 (1992); Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penalties and
the US. Sentencing Commission's "Mandatory Guidelines," 4 FED. SENTENCING REP.
129, 130 (1991) [hereinafter Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penalties].
Various members of the Sentencing Commission have offered explanations for pre-
ferring a modified real offense model to an offense-of-conviction system. Commissioner
Breyer suggests that the Commission focused on the limitations of a charge offense
system. Such systems may overlook that crimes may be committed in many different
ways and that society has thus far thought that differences in conduct during the crime
should have an impact on punishment. Breyer, supra note 2, at 9. He also points out
the potential procedural difficulties attendant to a pure real offense system and empha-
1192
1993] FEDERAL SENTENCING 1193
ishment directly to the offense of conviction. A number of
successful state guidelines systems have adopted this approach, gen-
erally prohibiting reference to nonconviction offenses and prescrib-
ing very narrow ranges in which judges may distinguish between
cases. 54 Conversely, a "real offense" system is theoretically uncon-
strained by the crime of conviction and may justify punishment de-
cisions by reference to the "actual" offense. The majority 'of the
states and the federal system operate under some version of a real
offense model.55 At its most expansive, a real offense model might
base punishment decisions on the following factors: the current con-
viction and attendant circumstances; nonconviction offenses com-
mitted contemporaneously with the conviction offense;
nonconviction offenses committed after the conviction offense;
56
prior convictions and nonconviction offenses; and, perhaps, even a
host of biographic components from good works to employment
history.57 Under such an approach, a judge sentencing an offender
sizes that the system ultimately adopted was the result of a compromise between the
two extremes. Id. at 8-12. Though Commissioner Nagel does not detail the Commis-
sion's reasons for preferring a modified real offense approach, she does refer to one of
the early Guidelines drafts setting forth the relative merits of the two systems. The
draft noted that the principal merit of the real offense approach is to allow the "judge to
differentiate between seemingly alike offenders whose offense behavior is actually quite
different." Nagel, supra note 2, at 925 n.228. A conviction offense model was thought
to be hindered by the "vague statutory language" of the federal criminal code, which
made it inevitable that some real conduct would be taken into account. Id. at 926
n.228.
54. Minnesota and Washington are examples of state guidelines systems that rely
on a "conviction offense" model. See generally Reitz, supra note 2, at 535-41 (discuss-
ing the states' rejection of real offense sentencing, the practice under the conviction
offense model, and advocating the abandonment of real offense sentencing on policy
grounds). The Commission was urged to follow the Minnesota approach, which is gen-
erally acknowledged to be the most respected among the state systems. See DALE G.
PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 219-35 (Daniel J. Freed ed., 1988). For a description of the
differences in approach between the federal and Minnesota guidelines and a critique of
the Federal Commission's choices, see Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States
Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 YALE L.J. 1773, 1773-93 (1992).
55. See Reitz, supra note 2, at 528 & n.22 (listing jurisdictions that allow real of-
fense sentencing).
56. Obstruction of justice, perjury, and prison escape are examples of offenses com-
mitted after the offense of conviction that are often considered during sentencing.
57. Reitz, supra note 2, at 527-28. As Professor Reitz points out, this definition
may "stretchf the natural connotations of the term 'real offense.' The words alone
suggest an inquiry into what 'really' happened in connection with the instant crime."
Id. at 527.
.The term "real offense sentencing" has not enjoyed a consistent definition. For
instance, the Guidelines' introductory comment describes a "real offense" system as one
in which sentences are based on "the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged
regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted" noting that "[a] pure
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indicted and convicted of aggravated assault may legitimately prem-
ise punishment on attempted murder if the facts brought to the
court's attention at sentencing so suggest.
The Commission adopted a "modified" real offense system. 58
It is modified in the sense that the conviction offense is used as a
starting point to determine the base offense level.5 9 In addition, the
Guidelines narrow considerably the breadth of nonconviction of-
fense and biographic information previously deemed relevant in the
federal system.6° Many sections of the Guidelines, however, con-
tinue to hinge punishment on nonconviction offenses. Some of the
more visible of these provisions are examined below.
1. Relevant Conduct
The relevant conduct provision, 61 crowned the "cornerstone"
of the Guidelines system by the Chairman of the Sentencing Com-
mission,62 is the most far-reaching method by which unconvicted
criminal conduct is integrated into the sentencing decision. 63 In de-
termining an offender's base offense level, the sentencing judge re-
real offense system would sentence on the basis of all identifiable conduct." U.S.S.G.,
supra note 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. Commissioner Nagel describes real offense sentencing as
based on "alleged real conduct ... [like that] ... charged in the indictment, or in the
government's version, or the pre-sentence report" prepared by the probation officer.
Nagel, supra note 2, at 925. Similarly, Commissioner Breyer describes the real offense
model as linking punishment to "the elements of the specific circumstances of the case."
Breyer, supra note 2, at 10.
58. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 926-27; Wilkins & Steer, supra note 2, at 497.
59. Nagel, supra note 2, at 926-27.
60. Under the indeterminate model, the sentencing judge could include informa-
tion about nonconviction offenses completely unrelated to the offense of conviction.
See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949) (allowing consideration of
"certain activities of appellant as shown by the probation report that indicated appellant
possessed 'a morbid sexuality'" in determining sentence for a murder charge). The
Guidelines arguably limit consideration of uncharged conduct to activities more closely
related to the crime of conviction. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 2, at 502 (noting
that the Guidelines "do not mirror the constitutional outer limits of information that a
court may consider for sentencing purposes"); see, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
§ 1BI.3(a)(1), (2) (discussed in detail infra subpart I.B.1.). In addition, much of the
biographic information previously deemed relevant has been discounted by U.S.S.G.,
supra note 1, §§ 5H1.1-.6, which specifically finds that a defendant's age, education,
mental and emotional condition, physical condition, employment record, family and
community ties, and prior good works in the community are not "ordinarily relevant."
Reference to race, sex, and national origin is prohibited. Id § 5H1.10.
61. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3.
62. Wilkins & Steer, supra note 2, at 495.
63. The relevant conduct provisions have drawn intense scrutiny and criticism.
See, e.g., Freed, supra note 2, at 1712-15; Heaney, supra note 2, at 208-25; Symposium,
The Issue of Relevant Conduct, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 129 (1989); Symposium, Tur-
moil over Relevant Conduct in the Ninth Circuit, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 189 (1992).
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fers both to the crime of conviction and to any other conduct
deemed relevant under Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines. Relevant
conduct encompassing nonconviction offenses may be roughly di-
vided into two categories.64 The first, which contains two subparts,
includes:
(A) all acts and omissions committed or aided, abetted, coun-
seled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused
by the defendant; and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a crim-
inal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by
the defendant in concert with others, whether or not
charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts
and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly under-
taken criminal activity,
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction,
in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to
avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. 65
This section incorporates both an accomplice liability concept and a
temporal element, requiring the court to view the offense of convic-
tion as a continuing action.66
The second category of relevant conduct applies exclusively to
cases in which the offense of conviction is subject to the multiple
count rules of Chapter Three of the Guidelines. 67 Such offenses,
64. A third category of relevant conduct, described in § lB1.3(a)(3), is also cited
occasionally in support for sentence enhancements based on unconvicted criminal con-
duct. This provision requires consideration of "all harm that resulted from the acts and
omissions specified in subsections (a)(l) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the
object of such acts or omissions." One of the most factually interesting cases applying
this provision is United States v. Kramer, 943 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1991) (approving
district court's sentence enhancement based on § 1B1.3(a)(l) and (3) for the property
damage resulting from the crash of a helicopter during an aborted prison escape at-
tempt), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 63 (1992).
65. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a)(l).
66. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 2, at 503-13.
67. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B.3(a)(2) provides: "[S]olely with respect to of-
fenses of a character for which § 3DI.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts,
all acts and omissions ... that were part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
§ 3D1.2(d) requires grouping of counts if the counts involve substantially the same
harm and the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total aggregate
harm. For example, if the defendant is convicted of two counts of theft of social secur-
ity checks and three counts of mail fraud, with five different victims, the counts are
grouped together. Id. § 3DI.2 cmt. 6, example 2. Also included in this subsection are,
for example, larceny, embezzlement, and other forms of theft, id. § 2B 1.1; receiving,
transporting, transferring, transmitting, or possessing stolen property, id. § 2B1.2; and
damaging or destroying property, id. § 2B1.3. The subsection explicitly excludes, for
example, burglary of a residence, id. § 2B2.1; trespass, id. § 2B2.3; and robbery, id.
§ 2B3.1.
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which include drug and theft crimes, generally involve sentence
lengths based upon the quantity possessed or stolen. In these cases,
any acts and omissions that were part of the "same course of con-
duct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction" must
be included when computing the base offense level. 6 Subsection
two also reaches well beyond the criminal act for which the defend-
ant is convicted to include contemporaneous and past acts of un-
convicted criminal conduct.
The clearest examples of the application of the relevant con-
duct provisions with respect to nonconviction offenses involve
charges of drug dealing. Under the Guidelines, sentence lengths for
drug crimes are determined by consulting the Drug Quantity Table
set forth in Chapter Two. 69 The table relies on the quantity and
type of drug allegedly involved to establish the base offense level. 70
For example, in United States v. Manor,71 a jury convicted the de-
fendant on 2 counts of intent to distribute 19 grams of cocaine, but
acquitted him of conspiracy to distribute 250 grams of cocaine
charged in the same indictment. 72 Note that under the first cate-
68. Id. § IBI.3(a)(2).
69. The Drug Quantity Table is set forth in id. § 2D 1.1(c).
70. In a recent article, Professor Alschuler blasts the Guidelines for, inter alia,
relying on the weight of the "mixture or substance" to determine sentence severity.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: .A Plea for Less Aggregation,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 919 (1991). As Alschuler explains, the Supreme Court recently
held in Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991), that this language includes
the weight of the "carrier medium" as well as the drug. Thus, because LSD may be sold
in sugar cube or blotter form:
a dealer is likely to pay an awesome price for the crime of using sugar
rather than paper .... [T]he guidelines sentence for a first offender who
sold 100 doses of LSD in sugar cubes would be 188 to 235 months. The
dealer's sentence would have dropped by two-thirds (63 to 78 months)
had he or she sold the same quantity of LSD in blotter paper. The sen-
tence would have been cut more than in half again (to 27 to 33 months) if
the dealer had chosen gelatin capsules. And the sentence would have
been cut in more than half again (to 10 to 16 months) if the dealer had
sold the LSD in pure form.
Alschuler, supra, at 919 (citing Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1924 n.2). The mechanistic,
"equal nonsense for all" approach to sentencing embodied by the Guidelines led Al-
schuler to declare: "Some things are worse than sentencing disparity, and we have
found them." Id. at 902.
In December 1992, the Commission published a set of "proposed amendments" for
public comment, one of which addresses the proper interpretation of "mixture or sub-
stance." The proposal suggests that the following language be added to the commen-
tary following U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2D1.1: "Mixture or substance does not include
uningestible, unmarketable portions of drug mixtures .... Proposed Amendments To
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 52 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2158 (Feb. 3, 1993).
71. 936 F.2d 1238 (11th Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 1242.
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gory of relevant conduct, drugs that are allegedly the subject of a
consiracy may be attributed to a defendant regardless of whether he
is charged with conspiracy. 7a Consequently, the court added the
250 grams alleged in the conspiracy count to the 19 grams from the
conviction counts to raise the base offense level from 12 to 20, effec-
tively tripling the defendant's sentence exposure.
74
In United States v. Rivera-Lopez,75 the defendant was indicted
on three counts: conspiracy to distribute cocaine and two separate
counts of possession. 76 At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of
conspiracy and one count of possession, but found her not guilty of
the possession of three kilograms of cocaine alleged in count two.
77
At sentencing, the trial judge calculated the weight of the drugs
with which the defendant was "connected" in order to determine
the proper base offense level. Concluding, pursuant to subsection
two of the relevant conduct provision, that the possession of the
three kilograms of which the defendant had been acquitted formed
"part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as
the offense[s] of conviction, ' 78 the court included the three kilo-
grams in the calculation. 79 This decision moved the defendant's
base offense level from level 28, yielding a sentencing range of 78 to
97 months, to level 32 and a sentencing range of 121 to 151 months.
In both Manor and Rivera-Lopez, the addition of the relevant
conduct resulted in the identical punishment ranges which the de-
fendants would have encountered had they been convicted on all
counts. This is not always the case. In some instances, the dismis-
sal of a count pursuant to a plea bargain or an acquittal after jury
trial acts to limit the defendant's potential exposure. The crime of
conviction determines the maximum term to which a defendant
73. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § IBI.3(a)(1)(B).
74. Manor, 936 F.2d at 1242. The defendant's sentencing range for a base level of
12 yielded a sentencing range of 10-16 months, while a base level of 20 required a
sentence of 33-41 months. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 288. On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, explaining that the jury's acquittal may have simply meant that the
250 gram transaction was not associated with the conspiracy charged, not that the
transaction never occurred. The court further noted that, even if the jury acquittal did
mean that the prosecutor had not met the reasonable doubt standard on the conspiracy
charge, the sentencing judge could still consider the 250 grams because the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard applied at sentencing and "an acquittal based on a reason-
able doubt standard should not preclude a contrary finding using the preponderance of
the evidence." Manor, 936 F.2d at 1243.
75. 928 F.2d 372 (11th Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 372.
77. Id.
78. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a)(2).
79. Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d at 372.
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may be sentenced. Consequently, conviction of a crime having a
lower maximum term than the sum of potential Guidelines
sentences for all counts may dilute the impact of relevant conduct.
Conduct need not ever have been charged to be deemed "rele-
vant." In fact, according to a four-district study conducted by
Eighth Circuit Judge Gerald Heaney, evidence of uncharged con-
duct was responsible for sentence increases in fifty percent of the
Guidelines cases. 80 United States v. Andrews 81 clearly demonstrates
the influence uncharged criminal conduct may exercise over the de-
fendant's ultimate term of imprisonment. In Andrews, the defend-
ant was charged with two counts of aiding and abetting bank
robbery and two counts of using a firearm in connection with a vio-
lent crime . 2 He pleaded guilty to one aiding and abetting count
and one firearm count, which, under the Guidelines, would have
yielded a sentencing range of thirty-seven to forty-six months.83
The sentencing judge, however, increased the defendant's sentence
based on the defendant's admitted participation in five uncharged
bank robberies. 84 The increase resulted in a sentence of ninety
months, almost double the maximum specified by the Guidelines for
the crimes of conviction.8 5
2. Specific Offense Characteristics
Each offense category outlined in Chapter Two of the Guide-
lines lists a series of "specific offense characteristics" to be deter-
mined in assessing the base offense level.86 The most visible
80. Heaney, supra note 2, at 210. This figure, derived from data in four districts in
the Eighth Circuit for the calendar year 1989, does not purport to include only cases
involving relevant conduct adjustments. Id. at 167. Given, however, that the relevant
conduct provision provides the most extensive means by which unconvicted criminal
conduct may be counted at sentencing, it seems safe to assume that Heaney's findings
would not have yielded a substantially lower percentage by restricting the survey to
instances in which relevant conduct was referenced.
Judge Heaney's research regarding the disparity attributable to the Guidelines pro-
voked responses from both Commission Chairman Wilkins, see William W. Wilkins,
Jr., Response to Judge Heaney, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 795 (1992), and Professor Ste-
phen Schulhofer, see Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process, supra note 2.
While these articles take issue with Heaney's statistical data and conclusions regarding
disparity, they do not question the validity of Heaney's survey regarding sentence en-
hancements for uncharged conduct.
81. 948 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 448.
83. Id. at 448-49.
84. Id. at 449.
85. Id.
86. These are listed with particularity for each Guidelines offense category. For
example, kidnapping, abduction, and unlawful restraint, U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
1198 [Vol. 40:1179
19931 FEDERAL SENTENCING 1199
instance in which a specific offense characteristic encompasses a
nonconviction offense occurs in connection with the possession of a
gun during a drug offense.8 7 For example, United States v. Rodri-
guez-Gonzalez 88 involved a jury trial for various narcotics offenses
and one count of carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).89 Although DEA agents testi-
fied that they found a loaded .357 magnum revolver in the defend-
ant's apartment, 9° the jury declined to find the defendant guilty on
the firearm charge, convicting him only of the narcotics crimes. 9'
At sentencing, the judge enhanced the defendant's base offense
score by two levels because he found that a "firearm was possessed
during the commission of the offense."' 92 The inclusion of the ac-
quittal offense changed the defendant's sentencing range from 78 to
97 months to 97 to 121 months.9 3 The defendant received a sen-
tence of 110 months-at least a year and a month longer than he
could have received absent consideration of the acquittal conduct.
94
3. Obstruction of Justice
A recent rash of cases have upheld sentence enhancements for
uncharged perjury under the "Obstruction of Justice" provision.95
§ 2A4. 1, provide for base offense level adjustments for various specific offense character-
istics: if a ransom demand was made, increase the base by 6 levels; if the victim sus-
tained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, increase by 4 levels; and if the victim
was released before 24 hours had elapsed, decrease by 1 level.
87. The specific offense characteristic identified in id. § 2D1.l(b)(1) requires a two-
level increase in the base offense score "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm)
was possessed" during a drug crime.
88. 899 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 127 (1990).
89. Id. at 178.
90. See id. at 179.
91. See id. at 178-79.
92. Id. at 179 (citing U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2D.l(b)(1)).
93. See id. at 179, 181.
94. Id. It should be noted that had the defendant been convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976) (recodified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1988)), his sentence would
have been substantially longer. Section 924(c) requires a five year mandatory sentence
consecutive to the sentence for the other offenses of which the defendant is convicted.
Thus, this case provides a good illustration of a situation in which an acquittal limits a
defendant's sentence exposure even though the Guidelines require consideration of the
acquittal conduct.
95. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 3C1.1 requires a two-level enhancement in the base
offense score if a defendant is found to have "willfully obstructed or impeded, or at-
tempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense." The application notes provide a par-
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For instance, in United States v. Akitoye, 96 a defendant accused of
conspiracy and drug trafficking testified at trial that he knew noth-
ing about the heroin or marked money found in his apartment and
tried to place responsibility for the entire affair on his front man.97
The sentencing judge characterized the testimony as "a self-serving
cock and bull story" and increased the base offense level by two for
the alleged perjury.98 Absent the two-level perjury enhancement,
the maximum sentence that the defendant could have received was
ninety-seven months.99 Instead he was sentenced to 114 months, 1°°
nearly a year and one half of which is directly attributable to his
uncharged crime of "perjury."
4. Departure
Unconvicted criminal conduct has been used as the basis for
departure in a number of cases; however, the Guidelines specifically
contemplate departure for nonconviction offenses in section
4A1.3(e). This section allows a discretionary departure if "prior
similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal convic-
tion" 101 indicates that the defendant's criminal history category
does not "adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past
criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit
tial list of the types of conduct encompassed by this description including "committing,
suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury." Id. § 3C1.L cmt. 3(b).
The Supreme Court recently upheld § 3C1.1 against constitutional attack. In
United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993), the Court unanimously rejected the
defendant's claim that allowing enhancement for alleged perjury chilled the exercise of
his Sixth Amendment right to testify on his own behalf. Id. at 1117-19. A better ap-
proach to sentence enhancements for obstruction of justice is advanced in William J.
Hazzard, Note, Oh What a Tangled Web We Weave When First We Practice to Deceive
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Enhancing Sentences for Defendant Perjury,
44 U. FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming June 1993) (arguing that only perjury that actually
obstructs justice in a significant enough manner to warrant resort to the district court's
contempt powers should result in an enhancement at sentencing). See generally Peter J.
Henning, Balancing the Need for Enhanced Sentences for Perjury at Trial Under Section
3C.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the Defendant's Right to Testify, 29 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 933 (1992) (analyzing recent decisions concerning sentence adjustments based
on the defendant's perjury at trial).
96. 923 F.2d 221 (lst Cir. 1991).
97. Id. at 229.
98. Id. at 228.
99. The Akitoye opinion does not indicate the maximum term the defendant faced
absent the perjury enhancement. However, it does note that the range after the en-
hancement was 97-121 months. Akitoye, 923 F.2d at 223. This range appears 3 times
in the sentencing table and in each instance the maximum of the range 2 levels below is
97 months. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 228.
100. Akitoye, 923 F.2d at 223.
101. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 4A1.3(e).
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other crimes." 102 For example, in United States v. Miller,10 3 the
sentencing court justified an upward departure based on several
state charges involving similar, though unrelated, criminal conduct
dismissed prior to sentencing in the federal action. The defendant
pleaded guilty to the robbery of several savings and loan associa-
tions. 10 4 After adjustments for relevant conduct and acceptance of
responsibility, the crime of conviction yielded a Guidelines sentenc-
ing range of thirty to thirty-seven months. 105 The court, however,
sentenced the defendant to forty-five months, adding at least eight
months for the several state charges dismissed after his plea of
guilty to the federal charges.10 6 According to the presentence re-
port, the state had charged Miller with gasoline theft of less than
three hundred dollars, on two separate occasions Miller had failed
to appear in court to face misdemeanor charges, and Miller had
been indicted for burglary of a hardware store two years prior to the
federal indictment. 107 After examining the presentence report upon
which the district court relied for departure, the Seventh Circuit
responded to Miller's complaint that the departure was based upon
"unreliable" information:
The report contains information from the state court
records that detailed the local burglary arrest circumstances.
Miller, with no right to be in the hardware store after it had
closed, was arrested inside. That account is adequate and factu-
ally not contested by Miller. The misdemeanor gasoline theft
charge, however, is less enlightening. What the factual circum-
stances were of that charge are not set out. The bench warrants
for failure to appear were related to the misdemeanor charge.
Defense counsel argues that Miller may not have received the
court appearance notices, or had some other innocent explana-
tion in defense of the bench warrants. There is no explanation in
the presentence report. Government counsel denied, based on
his personal knowledge as a former local assistant prosecutor,
that there could be an innocent explanation for the bench war-
rants. Judge Mills commented on the bench warrants and specif-
ically adversely considered them in imposing sentence.
The presentence report information on the misdemeanor
charge, and the related bench warrants, is not as complete as it
102. Id. § 4A1.3.
103. 874 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1989).
104. Id. at 468.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 468-69.
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... could be .... To permit a departure, however, [it is sufficient
under the Guidelines]. 10 8
Not all the courts of appeals have authorized departures on such
scanty records; however, the right of the trial court to depart on the
basis of a nonconviction offense is well supported by Guidelines
decisions. 109
C. Procedure at the Sentencing Hearing
As the cases demonstrate, the impact of factual findings at sen-
tencing and at trial may be indistinguishable. Although the govern-
ment must present some evidence of criminal behavior to secure
additional punishment for a nonconviction offense, 110 the quantum
and quality required at sentencing is well below that required at
trial.II Sentencing factors need only be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence in most federal courts, 112 and some circuits have
108. Id. at 469.
109. E.g., United States v. Kikumura, 706 F. Supp. 331, 334-35 (D.N.J. 1989) (de-
parting upward from a maximum term of 33 months to a 30-year sentence based on the
defendant's alleged terrorist activities), vacated, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990). The
Third Circuit remanded the case after a reasonableness analysis of the extent of the
departure, but did not question the right to depart for unconvicted criminal conduct.
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1119. The court did insist that the facts supporting such a large
enhancement be proven by clear and convincing evidence, id. at 1101, and limited the
maximum departure to a sentence of 262 months. Id. at 1119.
110. The district court is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988) to "state in open
court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence." See United States v.
Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (deferring to "the sentencing judge's
credibility determinations" because "Ithe issues were well-developed at the sentencing
hearing, and the judge had a full opportunity to consider the competing accounts").
The sheer amount of time judges must devote to sentencing hearings has generated
substantial criticism. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FED-
ERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 137 (1990) (reporting the results of a post-Guide-
lines survey that more than 50% of federal judges who responded estimated a 25%
increase in time devoted to sentencing, while one-third estimated an increase of 50%);
Alschuler, supra note 70, at 906 ("[S]entencing guidelines are unlike many other pro-
phylactic rules; they do not save work or money.").
111. A number of commentators have argued persuasively that the Due Process
Clause requires much greater procedural protection at the sentencing hearing than cur-
rently granted. See Heaney, supra note 2, at 208-25 (arguing that due process requires
a higher burden of proof at sentencing and raising concerns about a host of other consti-
tutional rights); Herman, supra note 2, at 346-55 (subjecting sentencing procedures to
analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge and finding them deficient); Husseini, supra note 2,
at 1404-11 (contending that due process requires use of the clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d 1238 (11th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Salmon, 948 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Macklin, 927 F.2d 1272 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 146 (1991); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 664 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1088 (1991); United States v. Dyer, 910 F.2d 530 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 276 (1990); United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648 (9th
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enunciated standards that appear even less stringent. 113 Neither the
Confrontation Clause1 14 nor the Federal Rules of Evidence apply at
the sentencing stage. 115 And although in most circuits the defend-
ant must be given an opportunity to contest allegations,"I6 he has no
right to a full evidentiary hearing to resolve such disputes. 117 Thus,
hearsay statements contained in the presentence report often pro-
vide the sole justification for a substantially greater term of impris-
onment under the Guidelines.' 18
Cir. 1990); United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 990
(1990); United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Isom,
886 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747 (5th Cir.
1989). But see Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101 (recommending a clear and convincing
standard of proof in some cases).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, No. 91-5796, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
4662, at *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 1992) ("[D]ue process requires that some evidentiary
basis beyond mere allegation in an indictment be presented to support consideration of
such conduct as relevant to sentencing."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 139 (1992); United
States v. West, 948 F.2d 1042, 1045 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The evidence of other quantities
of drugs involved must have a minimal level of reliability beyond mere allegation."),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1209 (1992); United States v. Coleman, 947 F.2d 1424, 1428
(10th Cir. 1991) (allowing the trial court to generally use "estimates based on informa-
tion with a minimum indicia of reliability in calculating drug quantities for sentencing
purposes"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1592 (1992).
114. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102-03. For a thoughtful argument in favor of
applying the Confrontation Clause at sentencing, see generally Note, supra note 2, at
1888-90.
115. United States v. Prescott, 920 F.2d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 1990) (allowing use of
hearsay statements at sentencing); United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198, 208 (7th Cir.
1983) (allowing suspension of best evidence rule at sentencing), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1004 (1984); see Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence
After Sixteen Years-the Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advi-
sory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the
Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 885-91 (1992).
116. See United States v. Evans, 891 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2170 (1990); United States v. Berrios, 869 F.2d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Holland, 850 F.2d 1048, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1988); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(a)(l)(A), 32(c)(3)(A)-(B), (D) (giving the defendant an opportunity to contest
presentence investigation).
117. The Guidelines require only that parties be "given an adequate opportunity to
present evidence to the court regarding" disputed sentencing factors. U.S.S.G., supra
note 1, § 6A1.3(a). In the commentary, the Commission notes that "[w]ritten state-
ments of counsel or affidavits of witnesses may be adequate under many circumstances."
Id. § 6AI.3 cmt. And although the Commission points out that "[a]n evidentiary hear-
ing may sometimes be the only reliable way to resolve disputed issues," the appropriate
hearing is left to the discretion of the trial judge. Id.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 2066 (1991). The Easterling court allowed the sentencing judge to
include 1815.2 grams of methamphetamine in sentencing on a charge of distributing 0.8
grams. Id. at 1076, 1078. The probation officer testified at the sentencing hearing that,
in arriving at the drug quantity figure, she relied on information provided to her by a
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agent. Id. at 1077. The agent had been told
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D. Rationale for Including Nonconviction Offenses as Sentencing
Factors
A real offense approach theoretically provides a way to differ-
entiate between offenders who are convicted of identical crimes, but
who engaged in meaningfully different behavior during the offense
of conviction.' 19 For example, assume Robbers A and B are both
convicted of bank robbery. Robber A, a convicted felon, spent
months planning and executing an extremely violent robbery gross-
ing millions of dollars; Robber B was desperate to feed a sick child,
had no weapon, and engaged in the crime on impulse. Arguably,
Robber A deserves more punishment than Robber B. The Guide-
lines' real offense regime accommodates this goal by treating "real"
factors, such as planning, violence during the crime, and amount
stolen, as sentencing characteristics. 120 Had the Commission
stopped here, that is, confined the Guidelines to the "real" circum-
stances of the crime of conviction and prior conviction offenses,
substantial differentiation among offenders could likely have been
achieved.
Instead, the Commission chose to sweep unconvicted criminal
conduct into the Guidelines. This choice reflects the Commission's
concern that prosecutorial charging decisions would undermine the
new sentencing system. 21 Without a mechanism for dampening
prosecutorial power, disparities would, of course, develop between
offenders charged and convicted of a crime and those who "really"
committed the same crime, but were never charged with it. To
about the defendant's methamphetamine involvement by two unidentified adult infor-
mants, who estimated that they purchased "approximately two pounds each" from the
defendant. Id. The 1815.2 gram figure was determined by adding four pounds to the
0.8 grams seized from the defendant when he was arrested, which established the drug
quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1077-78.
119. See Breyer, supra note 2, at 10-11.
120. Reflecting the pervasive concern that the plea bargaining practices would un-
dermine the Guidelines, Chapter Six prohibits prosecutors from bargaining away such
"facts" in plea agreements, thus allowing the court to assess an offender's blameworthi-
ness on the basis of actual offense conduct. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 6B1.1.
121. The Commission was particularly concerned that charge bargaining would un-
dermine the guidelines effort by creating disparity between similar defendants who
pleaded guilty to different crimes. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 505; Freed,
supra note 2, at 1713-14; Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 2, at 232-52; Wilkins & Steer,
supra note 2, at 500-01. Well before the adoption of the Guidelines, scholars warned
that charge bargaining could undermine the success of the Guidelines' efforts. See gen-
erally Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550
(1978); Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, supra note 2, at 757-72.
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eradicate such "unwarranted sentencing disparity"'' 22 from the sys-
tem, the Commission added mechanisms by which the judge must
count certain nonconviction offenses at sentencing. 23 Because
criminal conduct may be included at sentencing whether or not
charged or convicted, the disparity-producing effects of the original
charging decision and of the conviction are theoretically
neutralized.
The Commission's approach treats equally offenders convicted
of a crime and those merely accused of that crime. Viewed in this
light, it becomes clear that hinging punishment on nonconviction
offenses ensures much more than an appropriate sentence for a
given crime; it provides a method by which the court may correct
any errors committed by either the prosecutor or the jury, thereby
ensuring an "accurate" sentence. But notice that this adjustment
for "accuracy" never results in a lower sentence. It is a one-way
adjustment-up. In reality, incorporating nonconviction offenses as
sentencing factors does not avoid disparity, it only guarantees that
offenders are not less severely punished than their "true" conduct
allegedly warrants. 24 Thus, it is to guarantee proper severity that
the Guidelines authorize punishment for offenses excised from (or
never included in) an indictment pursuant to a charge bargain.
And although this system was originally conceived with charge bar-
gaining in mind, 25 the Commission has exhibited no qualms about
using nonconviction offenses to revise convictions secured by jury
trial. ' 26
122. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 28, at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3235
(calling the elimination of "unwarranted sentencing disparity" a primary goal of sen-
tencing reform).
123. The Guidelines require that a sentencing court "count" nonconviction offense
conduct that has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing
hearing in many, but not all, Guidelines sentence scores. Instances in which evidence of
nonconviction offense conduct results in a mandatory sentence enhancement are dis-
cussed in detail supra text accompanying notes 60-100. The Guidelines do not author-
ize enhancements for nonconviction offense conduct in every situation. In this respect,
the Guidelines' real offense system is narrower than that employed in the pre-Guidelines
era.
124. The court is assisted by the presentence report in assessing what really hap-
pened. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). If the prosecution is truly committed to manipulat-
ing the process, it is unlikely that the probation officer will uncover the requisite
information because it is from the prosecutor's office and the defendant that the proba-
tion officer typically obtains most of her information. See Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting
Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 777 (1992).
125. See supra note 121.
126. The Commission appears to be reconsidering this position. One of the pro-
posed amendments released by the Commission for public comment in December 1992
seeks to amend the relevant conduct provision to exclude "conduct of which the defend-
1993] 1205
UCLA LAW REVIEW
Although some aspects of a real offense model contribute to
the overall fairness of a sentencing system, the incorporation of
nonconviction offenses as sentencing factors produces the opposite
result. The Commission's preoccupation with unwarranted leni-
ency led it to dismiss difficulties potentially generated by prosecu-
tors' natural ambition to obtain the severest possible sentence for
the least amount of work. As demonstrated earlier, in many Guide-
lines cases, the presence or absence of a conviction for a given of-
fense is irrelevant to the punishment level. The nature of the
sentencing hearing, with its lower burden of proof and relaxed fact-
finding procedure, makes it much easier to secure punishment for a
given offense at sentencing than to obtain a conviction at trial or
even via guilty plea. 127 Even when the Guidelines authorize a less
severe punishment for the offense in the absence of a conviction, a
prosecutor still has a substantial incentive to withhold proof until
sentencing. The oppressive caseloads of the United States Attor-
neys offices are as well known as the desire of recent administrations
to appear "tough on crime.' 2 8 Even absent these pressures, count-
ing nonconviction offenses at sentencing would be an open invita-
tion to "undercharge" and beef up the punishment level at the
sentencing hearing. In the current environment, undercharging
risks becoming the norm. 129
The potential for such abuse did not evade the Commission.
The Guidelines introduction blithely suggests that the statutory
maximum "imposes a natural limit upon the prosecutor's ability to
increase a defendant's sentence."' 130 But the maximum terms desig-
nated by federal statutes are substantially higher than the average
ant has been acquitted after trial" from consideration under that section. Proposed
Amendments To the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 70, at 2158. In March
1993, the Department of Justice issued a statement strongly opposing the Commission's
proposed amendment. See Roger A. Pauley, Remarks Before the United States Sen-
tencing Commission Concerning Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Amendments (Mar.
22, 1993) (transcript on file with author). Given this development, it is unclear whether
the Commission's proposal will make the final list of proposed amendments to be sub-
mitted to Congress by May 1, 1993.
127. Many commentators have pointed out that the Guidelines actually enhance,
rather than control, the power of the prosecutor. See Freed, supra note 2, at 1714
("[Relevant conduct] allows a prosecutor to increase an offender's sentence more easily
by dropping charges than by bringing them!"); Heaney, supra note 124, at 774. But see
Wilkins, supra note 80, at 801-05.
128. See Alschuler, supra note 70, at 929-38 (describing the recent "severity revolu-
tion" in government's approach to crime).
129. See Tonry & Coffee, supra note 2, at 154-56 (citing examples of
undercharging).
130. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 1.
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sentence prescribed by the Guidelines (as well as those meted out in
the pre-Guidelines era), providing many years within which the
prosecution might maneuver at sentencing. 31 The Commission's
clear indifference to the potential for prosecutorial abuse demon-
strates an unquestioning faith in a single judge's ability to accu-
rately assess whether a defendant "really" committed additional
crimes. The Guidelines approach treats trial procedures designed
to avoid incorrect assessments of guilt as mere surplusage, having
no bearing on the truth of the accusation. 3 2 Quite obviously, the
Commission was a great deal more troubled by undeserved leniency
than by undeserved severity. The remainder of this Article explores
whether such postconviction revisions to the quality of the convic-
tion are constitutionally permissible.1 33
131. The Act mandates that career offenders receive sentences at or near the maxi-
mum, thus reserving much lower sentences for "typical" offenders. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)
(1988).
132. As Professor Stephen Schulhofer pointed out in 1980:
A declared policy placing greater weight upon the judge's conception of
offense behavior than upon the formal offense of conviction seems likely
to reinforce rather than dispel [cynicism about the criminal justice sys-
tem]. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more striking way for the legal
system to proclaim mistrust of its own processes.
Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, supra note 2, at 765; see also Tonry & Coffee,
supra note 2, at 153 (noting that real offense sentencing "downgrades the significance of
the trial stage"). It may well be, as Professor Kevin Reitz has suggested, that the im-
plicit ability to "shortcut" the trial process supplies a justification for embracing the real
offense model. According to Professor Reitz, the shortcut justification derives from the
view that:
[I]n the aggregate, convictions underrepresent the total number of crimes
committed by a healthy margin. There are many contributing causes of
this undisputed fact. Only some crimes are reported, still fewer result in
arrest, and not all arrests result in convictions. Some of the shortfall,
certainly, is attributable to the fact that trial process is time-consuming,
expensive, and includes many procedural hurdles. To the extent this is
so, real-offense sentencing can be defended as a cheaper, more efficient
method of responding to criminal behaviors.
Reitz, supra note 2, at 559 (footnotes omitted). Perhaps this view explains the Commis-
sion's preoccupation with ensuring the "accuracy" of the sentence even in the absence
of a conviction. It also explains why, in the face of years of documented overcharging,
see Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 85-105 (1968), the Commission is apparently convinced that charge bargains create
sentence differentials among "like" offenders. Such a position assumes an indictment is
as indicative of guilt as conviction (and in the case of trial by jury, that it is trial proce-
dure that saves the defendant from conviction). This is especially problematic when one
considers that in practice the preponderance of the evidence standard at sentencing
appears roughly equivalent to the probable cause standard for indictment.
133. The wisdom, as opposed to the constitutionality, of statutorily mandating such
obvious contempt for the trial process is questionable. Professor Kevin Reitz has re-
cently and eloquently argued that real offense systems should be abandoned as a matter
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II. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
NONCONVICTION OFFENSE SENTENCING
The array of constitutional challenges raised to the Guidelines'
real offense scheme is rivaled only by the monotony of response
from the federal courts. 134 With one exception, 135 the courts of ap-
peals have consistently answered such claims with a description of
the current system, rather than a discussion of the constitutional
propriety of punishment for nonconviction offenses.' 36 These cases
accept without analysis the historical distinction between trial and
sentencing, which has formed the linchpin of constitutional review
of sentencing practices during this century.
The Supreme Court officially endorsed real offense sentencing
in 1949. In Williams v. New York,' 37 Justice Black found nothing
in the Due Process Clause that inherently limits a judge's discretion
to consider uncharged and unproven conduct in determining a sen-
tence. ' 38 Williams had been convicted of first degree murder after a
jury trial.' 39 Choosing between the available penalties of death and
life imprisonment, the jury recommended the latter. '4 The judge
disagreed. After considering information contained in the
presentence report indicating that the defendant had committed a
string of uncharged burglaries,' 4' had "a morbid sexuality," and
was a "menace to society," the trial judge sentenced the defendant
to death. 42
of policy, even assuming the constitutionality of the practice. Reitz, supra note 2, at
547-73; see also Tonry & Coffee, supra note 2, at 152-67.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir.) (rejecting Fourth
Amendment challenge), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 124, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 334
(1992); United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting due process
challenge); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting Con-
frontation Clause challenge); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177 (2d
Cir.) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1990); United
States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting right to jury trial
challenge).
135. See United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding the use of
certain information necessarily rejected by the jury to be unconstitutional).
136. See, e.g., Mobley, 956 F.2d at 455 (noting that the "bifurcated criminal justice
process" embraces "the full panoply of constitutional rights" at the trial stage, but not
at sentencing); Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 180-81 (reinforcing Mobley's view).
137. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
138. Id. at 250-52.
139. Id. at 242.
140. See id. at 243-44.
141. The sentencing judge referred to the defendant's alleged participation in some
30 burglaries in the same vicinity as the murder. Id. at 244.
142. Id.
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Williams challenged his sentence on the grounds that he had
not been given "reasonable notice of the charges against him" in the
presentence report or "an opportunity to examine adverse wit-
nesses." 143 The Supreme Court rejected his claim, suggesting that
sentencing is unique and, thus, operates outside the strictures of
such constitutional limitations. According to the Court, sentencing
courts have historically operated under different evidentiary
rules.'" In addition, "sound practical reasons"'145 supported the
distinction between constitutional protections at trial and sentenc-
ing. Because a "sentencing judge ... is not confined to the narrow
issue of guilt,"' 46 the Court concluded that any restrictions upon a
trial judge's ability to obtain "pertinent" information would under-
mine the modem penological goals of reformation and rehabilita-
tion. 147 Almost as an afterthought, the Court added that "no
federal constitutional objection would have been possible if the
judge here had sentenced appellant to death because appellant's
trial manner impressed the judge that appellant was a bad risk for
society, or if the judge had sentenced him to death giving no reason
at all." 48 Consequently, reasoned the Court, no due process issue
was created "merely because a judge gets additional out-of-court
information to assist him in the exercise" of his discretion.
49
Expansive assumptions about the power of government under-
gird the Court's decision. The first assumption is that the inferred
right to conceal from the public the true reasons for a sentence insu-
lates such reasons from constitutional scrutiny. The second is that
history and legislative policy choices trump constitutional rights.
In making these assumptions, the Court undertook no search for
constitutional authorization to treat sentencing as an extra-constitu-
tional proceeding. To support the legitimacy of subjecting sentenc-
ing practices to less scrutiny than other government activities, the
opinion offered only two sentences suggesting that, even before the
adoption of the Constitution, courts exercised "wide discretion" at
sentencing.' 50 Given that the bulk of criminal punishments in early
143. Id. at 245.
144. Id. at 246 & n.4.
145. Id. at 246.
146. Id. at 247.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 252. Interestingly, Justice Black cites nothing in support of this proposi-
tion. Williams, as it applies to death penalty cases, has been overruled. Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
149. Williams, 337 U.S. at 252.
150. According to Williams:
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America were legislatively fixed, leaving the trial court only mini-
mal flexibility in the imposition of a sentence,151 history offers un-
convincing authority for the actions complained of in Williams.
The Court devoted the remainder of the opinion to admiring the
penological policy choices of the state legislature. The Constitution
was presumed to take a back seat to the "progressive" judgments of
an elected government. 152 At base, Williams concluded that sen-
tencing decisions reside outside of the constitutional framework. 153
This concept, whether applied in the arena of judicial or legislative
sentencing, comprises the core of twentieth century sentencing
jurisprudence.
In 1978, the Supreme Court again turned to the constitutional-
ity of using unconvicted criminal conduct at sentencing. In United
States v. Grayson, 54 the defendant was convicted of a crime after a
jury trial at which he testified in his own defense. In a rare sentenc-
ing opinion, the trial judge disclosed his reasons for imposing a two-
year term, among them his belief that the defendant's testimony was
a "complete fabrication."' 5 5 On appeal, the defendant claimed that
punishment for uncharged perjury infringed on "his right to have
[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in
this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing
judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evi-
dence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punish-
ment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. Out-of-court affidavits
have been used frequently, and of course in the smaller communities sen-
tencing judges naturally have in mind their knowledge of the personalities
and backgrounds of convicted offenders.
Id. at 246 (footnotes omitted). In support of this information, the Court referred to
several collections of cases suggesting in many instances that affidavits about the defend-
ant's character were accepted. Id. at 246 nn.5-6 (citing cases collected at 14 Am. &
Eng. Ann. Cas. 968; 77 A.L.R. 1211; 86 A.L.R. 832; Note, The Admissibility of Charac-
ter Evidence in Determining Sentence, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 715 (1942); ROSCOE POUND,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 178 (1930)). It is somewhat of a leap, however, to
conclude from the Court's meager authorities regarding affidavits that the discretion of
the sentencing judge in early America was "wide" enough to encompass accusations of
30 uncharged burglaries and extensive biographic information in support of a death
sentence.
151. See infra note 226.
152. Williams, 337 U.S. at 251.
153. Professor Sanford Kadish, writing in 1962, charged that "[the rehabilitative
system] has resulted in vesting in judges and parole and probation agencies the greatest
degree of uncontrolled power over the liberty of human beings that one can find in the
legal system." Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sen-
tencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 916 (1962), reprinted in SANFORD H. KAD-
ISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 250 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
154. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
155. Id. at 44.
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criminal charges... formally adjudicated pursuant to procedures
required by due process." 156
Before addressing the merits of this claim, the Court delivered
an exhaustive account of the history of the indeterminate sentencing
system in the United States. 5 7 Grayson recognized the inherent po-
tential for arbitrary sentences created by the rehabilitative model
and concluded that only by providing "the judge with as much in-
formation as reasonably practical concerning the defendant's 'char-
acter and propensities'" could this dilemma be avoided.' 58 This
revelation was followed by a discussion of Williams v. New York,
United States v. Tucker,159 and a congressional statute'6--all of
which supported the idea that the sentencing court is "largely un-
limited either as to the kind of information it may consider, or the
source from which it may come."' 61
Following in the Williams tradition, the Court balanced the
defendant's constitutional objections against historical practice and
the importance of outside offense information to the prevailing pe-
nological goals. Though recognizing that the practice of "incarcer-
ating for the purpose of saving the Government the burden of
bringing a separate and subsequent perjury prosecution" would be
"impermissible," the Court was loath to restrict the right to con-
sider such information for the "permissible" purpose of evaluating
156. Id. at 45. The defendant also contended that allowing the sentencing court to
enhance for uncharged perjury would inhibit the exercise of a defendant's right to tes-
tify on his own behalf. Id. at 44-45. The majority dismissed this argument as "frivo-
lous." Id. at 55. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented on
this ground. According to the dissent:
It does not change matters to say that the enhanced sentence merely
reflects the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation rather than an addi-
tional punishment for testifying falsely. The fact remains that all defend-
ants who choose to testify, and only those who do so, face the very real
prospect of a greater sentence based upon the trial judge's unreviewable
perception that the testimony was untruthful.
Id. at 56-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 45-52.
158. Id. at 48 (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55
(1937)).
159. 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (requiring that the information in the presentence
report be reliable but placing no limit on the type of information that may be included).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1985), which provided that "[n]o limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a per-
son convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." Section 3577 has been recodified
in the Act as 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988).
161. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 50 (quoting Tucker, 404 U.S. at 446).
dAdd
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the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation. 62 Three justifications
for this conclusion were offered: (1) the necessity of access to the
information to facilitate the rational exercise of discretion at sen-
tencing,1 63 (2) the Williams decision itself,64 and (3) that "[n]o rule
of law, even one garbed in constitutional terms, can prevent im-
proper use of firsthand observations of perjury." 65
Both Williams and Grayson treat constitutional rights as
equivalent to legislative policy choices in the sentencing realm. The
result is uncontrolled discretion lodged with the trial court to im-
pose any sentence within the statutory range no matter how offen-
sive the judge's reasoning. Considered logically, such discretion can
exist pursuant to legislative delegation only if the legislature pos-
sesses, in the first instance, the same unchecked power to include
any potentially relevant information in the punishment inquiry.
Eight years later, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 66 the Court em-
braced this logic.
McMillan addressed the propriety of a state sentencing scheme
that prescribed a mandatory minimum sentence if visible possession
of a firearm during the crime of conviction was proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence at sentencing.1 67 The defendants offered
two due process challenges to the Pennsylvania plan. First, they
contended that the statute was inconsistent with In re Winship 168
and Mullaney v. Wilbur 169 because -possession of a firearm should
actually be considered an element of the crime of conviction.17 0 By
relegating proof of the firearm to sentencing, and by requiring only
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendants claimed
that the state had impermissibly circumvented its burden to estab-
lish criminal conduct by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' 7' The
Court rejected this argument, finding that a legislature's discretion
to allocate conduct between elements of a crime and factors for sen-
162. Id. at 53.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 53-54.
165. Id. at 54. Instead of attempting regulation, the Court looked to "[t]he integrity
of the judges" to assure that sentence enhancements are not made -simply to save the
Government the time and money attendant to a separate prosecution for perjury. Id.
166. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
167. Id. at 83.
168. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
169. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
170. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83.
171. Id.
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tencing is essentially absolute. 172 The Court's agreement that pos-
session of a firearm could properly be classified as a sentencing
factor was pivotal to the subsequent due process analysis. Accord-
ing to the Court, the statute did not relieve the prosecution of the
burden of establishing guilt because the firearm enhancement "only
[became] applicable after defendant has been duly convicted of the
crime for which he is to be punished."1 73 In addition, the Penn-
sylvania scheme "neither alter[ed] the statutory maximum ... nor
create[d] a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it oper-
ate[d] solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a
penalty within the range already available to it without the special
finding of visible possession of a firearm." 1 74 Absent the presence of
one of these factors, the Court found no fault with the legislative
plan, even though an affirmative finding at sentencing could poten-
tially increase a defendant's prison term by five years.
Defendants' second constitutional challenge-that due process
is offended by the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard
at sentencing-provoked a much terser, but equally important, re-
ply. Citing Williams, the Court responded that sentencing courts
have traditionally made such decisions without any due process lim-
itations on burdens of proof, and admitted "some difficulty fathom-
ing why the due process calculus would change simply because the
legislature has seen fit to provide sentencing courts with additional
guidance."1 75 Yet, by 1986, the philosophical and practical prem-
ises so influential to the Williams decision had been discredited.
176
Perhaps in an effort to explain the continued dichotomy in constitu-
tional scrutiny between trial and sentencing procedures, McMillan
looked to the reasoning in Meachum v. Fano,177 a case involving an
inmate's procedural due process challenge to an alleged retaliatory
prison transfer. Although Meachum appears only in a footnote, the
172. See id. at 85-86. The Court declined to define the constitutional limits of a
state's power to define criminal offenses, only noting that the Pennsylvania statutory
scheme "gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession
finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." Id. at 88. Professor
Herman attacks the McMillan decision on several fronts. She takes issue with the Mc-
Millan outcome, arguing that the Court flagrantly misinterpreted Patterson v. New York
and also suggests a formula by which the tail and dog limitation might be given substan-
tive meaning in the Guidelines era. See Herman, supra note 2, at 323-39.
173. 477 U.S. at 87.
174. Id. at 87-88.
175. Id. at 92.
176. By 1986, Congress had already abandoned the rehabilitative model in favor of
the Guidelines, as had many of the states.
177. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
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majority cited Meachum for the proposition that "[o]nce the rea-
sonable-doubt standard has been applied to obtain a valid convic-
tion, 'the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of
his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him.' "178 By
linking the lack of constitutional standards at sentencing to the ab-
sence of a liberty interest, the McMillan due process formula di-
vorced itself from the system's interest in obtaining relevant
information considered so crucial in Williams and Grayson.179
Combining the Meachum-McMillan theory-that a conviction
magically strips a defendant of his liberty interest in an as yet unde-
termined term of imprisonment to the full extent of the statutory
maximum-with the premises underlying Williams and Grayson-
that a legislature may delegate to a court absolute discretion to im-
pose any sentence below or equal to the statutory maximum using
any available information to arrive at a proper sentence-yields a
legislative power to operate outside due process constraints in set-
ting punishment for any crime for which the legislature has statuto-
rily designated a maximum punishment. In other words, by its very
act of naming a statutory maximum, a government erases that
amount of a potential defendant's liberty interest in his freedom,
thereby escaping the scrutiny of the Due Process Clause. Post-
Guidelines cases have seized upon this analysis, and in so doing
178. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 92 n.8 (quoting Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224). Meachum
responded to an inmate's procedural due process challenge to a prison transfer, that is,
to a claim by a person who had already been sentenced to a specific term. The words
"to the extent the State may confine him" quite obviously refer to the term given at
sentencing, not to the maximum term delineated by statute. This point is easily dis-
cerned by reviewing the entire quote from Meachum, as opposed to the sliver culled out
by Justice Rehnquist: "[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been con-
stitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the state may confine him and
subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do
not otherwise violate the Constitution." 427 U.S. at 224. Note that the Meachum
Court felt no need to provide any citation for this proposition.
As Professor Kadish has explained, the importation of reasoning from the parole-
prison arena to the sentencing stage is inappropriate:
Daily housekeeping decisions in the conduct of an institution are not of
the same order as sentencing-type decisions governing release and term,
either in their impact on the individual or the significance to him, in the
closeness of the relationship to the original processes of guilt determina-
tion, or in their potential for contaminating the mainstream of tradition
with regard to notions of the rule of law.
KADISH, supra note 153, at 256; see also Herman, supra note 2, at 331-32.
179. Professor Herman points out that by "turning to Meachum [the McMillan
Court] merely assumed an answer and continued the tradition of treating sentencing as
a matter completely separate from conviction." Herman, supra note 2, at 332.
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have removed any impediment to a government's decision to rele-
gate unadjudicated crimes to the status of sentencing factor.
Consider, for example, the Third Circuit's response in United
States v. Mobley180 to an argument challenging a "sentence en-
hancement" for possession of a stolen gun, a crime admittedly not
charged because the government lacked proof of scienter:
[Defendant] confuses the fundamental distinction between con-
viction and sentencing. Moreover he confuses the distinction
among a sentence, a sentence enhancement and the definition of
a crime. In our bifurcated criminal justice process, at the trial
stage the accused receives the full panoply of constitutional
rights .... At the sentencing stage, however, a convicted criminal
is entitled to less process than a presumptively innocent
accused. 18 1
Mobley received the same punishment pursuant to the "possession
of stolen firearm" sentencing factor 182 that he would have received
had he been convicted of "possession of a stolen firearm pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(i) or (j).1 183 The conduct prohibited by the two
provisions was identical; however, the sentencing factor eliminated
the scienter requirement. In response to the defendant's insistence
that he was in fact being punished for statutorily prohibited crimi-
nal conduct in the absence of a conviction, the court explained:
This argument misses the point. [Defendant] was not charged
under §§ 922(i) or (j); he was charged under § 922(g). He was
not sentenced for violating §§ 922(i) or (j); he was sentenced for
violating § 922(g). The [Guidelines] did not sentence or enhance
his sentence for violating §§ 922(i) or (j); it enhanced his sen-
tence for violating § 922(g). The argument misperceives the dis-
tinction between a sentence and sentence enhancement.'
84
180. 956 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1992).
181. Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
182. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2K2.1(b)(4). The Mobley court incorrectly cited to
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2K2. 1(b)(2), which allows sentence reduction if a firearm was
owned for sporting reasons. Subsection (b)(4) allows for increase if the gun is stolen.
183. "Together § 922(i) and § 922(j) provide that any person who 'transport[s]' or
'receive[s] ... any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe' it stolen is culpable." Mobley, 956 F.2d at 454 (second emphasis
added).
184. Id. at 456-57 (quoting United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir.
1989)). The court continued, pointing out that:
[Defendant] seeks to blur the distinction among a sentence, sentence
enhancement, and definition of an offense. If he was correct, anytime
specific offense characteristics of a sentence enhancement satisfy some el-
ement of a separate offense, many applications of the guidelines would be
constitutionally in doubt. [The Court then referenced relevant conduct
provisions]. These acts or omissions could in many cases satisfy elements
of other offenses and constitute grounds for more charges.
121519931
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After uttering this ipse dixit, the opinion pointed out that the sen-
tence-sentence enhancement distinction "may be academic to the
defendant who must serve the sentence, but it is analytically crucial
for the due process scrutiny."' 85According to Mobley's reading of McMillan, due process is im-
plicated only if a sentencing regime alters the statutory maximum,
negates the presumption of innocence, or creates a separate offense
calling for a separate penalty. 1 8 6 Mobley pointed out that the stolen
gun enhancement did not offend the statutory maximum for the
crime of conviction; that the presumption of innocence was not im-
pugned because the prosecutor's burden of proof at the conviction
stage suffered no modification; and, as explained above, that no new
offense had been created, notwithstanding the existence of a statu-
tory offense encompassing the same conduct. The Third Circuit's
approach, like that of the majority of the other courts of appeals,
excludes from due process scrutiny the Guidelines' choice of sen-
tencing factors, leaving only the accuracy of the sentencing proceed-
ing open to review. According to Mobley, "once convicted, a
defendant has a liberty interest in the correct application of the
Guidelines within statutory limits, nothing more and nothing
less." 87
The same analysis accounts for the perverse reasoning in cases
upholding punishment for acquittal conduct. The most well known
among these is undoubtedly the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Juarez-Ortega.188 The defendant was convicted by jury of
two counts of intent to distribute, and acquitted of carrying a fire-
arm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking offense.1 89 At
sentencing, the district judge voiced obvious dissatisfaction with the
jury's acquittal,1 90 and instead of imposing the twelve to eighteen
month term called for by the Guidelines in the absence of a gun,
sentenced the defendant to seventy-six months-the same term re-
ceived by the defendant's codefendant who had been convicted on
Id. at 457-58 (footnote omitted). The court then notes that other courts have rejected
this idea. Id. at 458.
185. Id. at 457.
186. Id. at 456 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986)).
187. Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
188. 866 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1989).
189. Id. at 748; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
190. For a description of this dissatisfaction, see infra notes 262-63 and accompany-
ing text.
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the firearm count. 19 1 In response to Juarez-Ortega's argument that
the court "in effect overrode the jury's determination of a fact issue
with regard to the question of the firearm," the Fifth Circuit
replied:
This argument is without merit. Although the jury may have
determined that the government had not proved all of the ele-
ments of the weapons offense beyond a reasonable doubt, such a
determination does not necessarily preclude consideration of un-
derlying facts of the offense at sentencing so long as those facts
meet the reliability standard. The sentencing court was not rely-
ing on facts disclosed at trial to punish the defendant for the ex-
traneous offense, but to justify the heavier penalties for the
offenses for which he was convicted.192
The confidence with which the federal courts embrace an obvi-
ously semantic, and concededly "academic," distinction is startling.
Relying on McMillan, the cases suggest that the simple fact of con-
viction justifies use at sentencing of any information deemed rele-
vant by the legislature. Because a court is not sentencing for the
nonconviction offense, but is in fact engaged in determining the
proper level of deprivation for the conviction offense, the legisla-
ture's choice to include unadjudicated crimes as sentencing factors
is immune from scrutiny. The sentencing court need only concern
itself with the reliability of facts on which it chooses to base the
sentence.
Such an approach vests enormous unchecked power with the
legislature. Theoretically, statutory maximums could be increased
to levels high enough to accommodate punishment for any crimes
allegedly committed by a convicted offender, obviating the govern-
ment's burden to prove the bulk of criminal activity by proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 93 The federal courts, however, have
191. Although the Fifth Circuit upheld this sentence, the district court actually ap-
plied the Guidelines incorrectly. The district court should have enhanced the defend-
ant's base level offense for possessing a dangerous weapon during a drug crime pursuant
to § 2D1.1(b). Instead the sentencing court departed under Chapter Five to reach the
76-month sentence. The departure is technically impermissible in that it relies on a
factor clearly considered by the Commission in drafting the Guidelines.
192. 866 F.2d at 749. Only the Ninth Circuit has refused to use acquittal informa-
tion at sentencing. See United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 850-52 (9th Cir. 1991).
Other courts of appeals have expressed their agreement with the Fifth Circuit's result
on the basis that an "acquittal demonstrates only a lack of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt; it does not necessarily establish the defendant's innocence." United States v.
Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1989).
193. This scenario differs from that posed by the dissenters in Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), in that it would still require the government to name and
prove all the elements of some crime. In Patterson, the dissenters worried that the
legislature could provide merely a generic crime with no elements and shift the burden
1993] 1217
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simply declined to question the assumption that conduct prohibited
by criminal statute may, at the government's whim, be relegated to
the status of sentencing factor.
III. CONVICTION AS PREREQUISITE TO PUNISHMENT
A. The Flaw in the Supreme Court's Model
The Supreme Court's due process analysis must be reconsid-
ered, not in response to the change in sentencing structure, 194 but
because the approach was wrong in the first instance. Viewed
through the prism of the Guidelines, it becomes clear that the pre-
vailing due process formula is deeply flawed. The formula
presumes that the very act of designating a maximum punishment
presumptively vests the state with that amount of the defendant's
liberty upon conviction, rendering the legislature's, or court's,
choice of sentencing factors irrelevant to the due process analysis. 195
to the defendant to disprove factors. Id. at 227-28 (Powell, J., dissenting). The results
of either of these Orwellian hypotheses are strikingly similar.
194. Several commentators have suggested that the due process analysis developed
in Williams, Grayson, and McMillan is rendered obsolete by the Act's explicit rejection
of the indeterminate sentencing model. Because the Act excludes rehabilitation as a
legitimate purpose of incarceration, a sentencing court's need for information regarding
the offender's "prospects for rehabilitation" considered so crucial in Williams and Gray-
son has vanished. See Heaney, supra note 2, at 215-20; Herman, supra note 2, at
340-42; Harvey M. Silets & Susan W. Brenner, Commentary on the Preliminary Draft
of the Sentencing Guidelines Issued by the United States Sentencing Commission in Sep-
tember, 1986, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1079-92 (1986). Similarly, com-
mentators have pointed out that the pre-Guidelines cases hinged their analyses on the
sentencing judge's ability to sentence the offender to the statutory maximum without
disclosing his reasons. The Guidelines have eliminated both the discretionary ability to
sentence absent explanation and in most cases the right to sentence to the extent of the
statutory maximum. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988) (mandating that career offenders
receive sentences at or near the maximum, thus reserving much lower sentences for
"typical" offenders); Husseini, supra note 2, at 1399-401; see also Heaney, supra note 2,
at 215-20.
195. This position has historically been defended on two grounds. First, it is argued
that because the state could have punished the offender to the extent of the statutory
maximum, a lesser sentence represents the dispensation of grace. Thus, the theory goes,
no legal claim may be attached to "an act of merciful leniency," because it is a privilege
rather than a right. Kadish, supra note 153, at 920. At base, this theory must assume
that every criminal statute is the result of a legislative consensus that the crime defined
therein merits the maximum punishment listed, and that only the mercy of the sentenc-
ing court causes a lesser sentence. Such a description is at odds with reality; federal
criminal statutes set forth a range of appropriate punishment. There is a minimum and
a maximum for each statute. At no point in the federal criminal code is it suggested
that a judge must begin his or her inquiry at the top of the range and count down. As
Williams makes clear, the indeterminate sentence was conceived in an effort to inject
humanity into the sentencing process and allowed judges to pick the "appropriate" sen-
tence within a range of possibilities. The "grace" argument is even harder to sustain in
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Such unbridled governmental power is flatly at odds with the philo-
sophical underpinnings and structure of the Constitution.
The government of the United States is one of limited pow-
ers;' 96 its very design assumes the worth of the individual, the dan-
ger of government abuse, and the need for restraint of government
actors.197 Yet the McMillan approach suggests that Congress may
create a space in which it, or the courts, may act outside the bounds
of the Constitution to restrain an individual's actual liberty. No
authorizing language may be gleaned to support such a position.198
In fact, the very extremes to which the courts have had to go in
order to protect this ideology demonstrate its incompatibility with
the constitutional framework. Almost the entire Bill of Rights has
had to be defined away:' 99 the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
the Guidelines environment in which it is absolutely clear that sentencing is based on
aggravating as well as mitigating factors. The notion that mercy accounts for the extra-
constitutional character of the sentencing inquiry seems even more implausible under a
guidelines system, when "grace" is dispensed mandatorily on a system-wide basis pursu-
ant to a mechanical scoring process.
Perhaps inherent in the "grace" approach, but often discussed as a separate ration-
alization for the system, is the notion that a convicted criminal is an "outlaw"-a " 'na-
ked criminalfl, hoping for mercy but entitled only to justice,' neither a 'citizen, nor
entitled to invoke the organic safeguards which hedge about the citizen's liberty.'" Id.
(footnotes omitted). As an outcast, the convicted offender exists beyond the parameters
of constitutional protection. Professor Kadish's eloquent response in the context of the
indeterminate model remains persuasive today:
[T]he argument is immoral; and it underrates the danger to the general
community. A first tenet of our governmental, religious, and ethical tra-
dition is the intrinsic worth of every individual no matter how degener-
ate. It is a radical departure from that tradition to accept for a defined
class of persons, even criminals, a regime in which their right to liberty is
determined by officials wholly unaccountable in the exercise of their
power ....
Secondly, attitudes and values are infectious. The way official power
is exercised over the criminal is bound to have repercussions on how it is
exercised over the accused; and how it is exercised over the accused is
bound to affect how it is exercised over the general community.
Id. at 923-24; see also Reitz, supra note 2, at 557-59.
196. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The original and
supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments .... ").
197. As James Madison elegantly phrased it in explaining the concept of ordered
liberty: "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
198. On the contrary, the Due Process Clause by its very terms applies to depriva-
tions of liberty; a comparable provision excluding the sentencing stage from Constitu-
tional constraint is strikingly absent. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
199. Not only has the Court been required to manipulate many of the Bill of Rights
protections to support its approach to due process at sentencing, but it has also had to
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apply at sentencing; 200 the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches does not apply at sentencing;201 the Confron-
tation Clause does not apply at sentencing. 20 2 In addition, cases
applying the Court's approach have been forced to adopt absurd
positions to support their results: an acquittal is no protection
against punishment;20 3 a convicted defendant has no liberty interest
in his liberty; 204 a citizen whose punishment is increased on the ba-
sis of specific conduct is not being punished for that conduct. 20 5
Such obvious inanities could not fail to astound the general pub-
lic. 20 6 Nor should we allow our legal training to dull our intellects
to such nonsense.
Admittedly, the Constitution provides little affirmative gui-
dance regarding factors that may be incorporated into the sentenc-
do this selectively and inconsistently. See Herman, supra note 2, at 316-42. Note that
the Confrontation Clause is not implicated at sentencing, United States v. Kikumura,
918 F.2d 1084, 1102-03 (3d Cir. 1990), but the right to counsel is constitutionally man-
dated, Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 738-41 (1948). Similarly, due process forbids
the use of prior convictions obtained unconstitutionally, United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 444-45, 447-49 (1972), yet condones inclusion of offenses that were never
even charged.
200. United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 181 (2d Cir.) (use of ac-
quittal conduct at sentencing does not violate Double Jeopardy Clause), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 127 (1990).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) (holding that
the sentencing judge should consider illegally obtained evidence where it was not seized
expressly to enhance the sentence), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 124 (1992); United States v.
McCrory, 930 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 885 (1992).
202. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. In addition, the very scope of the
sentencing inquiry historically authorized by the indeterminate system implies that the
First Amendment may not apply at sentencing. The rehabilitative model itself has
moral and religious underpinnings. Under most indeterminate systems, offenders' reli-
gious habits were routinely considered in presentence reports. Logically, under the
Grayson -Williams approach, any information relevant to a defendant's prospects for
rehabilitation could "properly" be considered by the sentencing court. An offender's
religious habits undoubtedly may be correlated with prospects for rehabilitation. Also,
Grayson might suggest that there would be no way to regulate the use of such informa-
tion for the improper purpose of discriminating against particular religions and the
proper purpose of assessing a defendant's prospects for rehabilitation.
203. See cases cited supra note 7.
204. Cf United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 455 (3d Cir. 1992) (suggesting that,
once convicted, a defendant "is entitled to less process than a presumptively innocent
accused").
205. See cases cited supra note 14.
206. Professor Freed comments:
Most lawyers, as well as ordinary citizens unfamiliar with the daily pro-
cedures of criminal law administration, are astonished to learn that a per-
son in this society may be sentenced to prison on the basis of conduct of
which a jury has acquitted him, or on the basis of charges that did not
result in conviction.
Freed, supra note 2, at 1714.
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ing inquiry.207 It does, however, delineate specific conduct that lies
outside the government's power to punish. In spite of the years of
operation under the Williams rubric, few scholars or courts would
argue that the Sentencing Commission could constitutionally have
categorized "failure to attend church" or "membership in the Dem-
ocratic Party" as aggravating factors under the Guidelines. 208 Just
as the Constitution prohibits punishment on the basis of religious or
political beliefs, it prescribes a specific procedure that must be
honored should the government seek to deprive an individual of his
freedom for a transgression of the criminal law. The mandates of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are not optional.20 9 By statutorily
classifying specific conduct as criminal, the legislature forfeits its
right to punish that behavior in any manner other than by recourse
to the criminal justice system established by the Constitution. 210
207. This Article does not attempt to delineate the information that must be consid-
ered at sentencing; it seeks to prove only that absent a conviction, criminal offenses are
outside the scope of the sentencing inquiry. An analysis of the proper allocation of facts
between the trial and sentencing hearing appears in Herman, supra note 2, at 342-55.
208. Before the Guidelines were adopted, the Fourth Circuit overturned evangelist
Jim Bakker's 45-year sentence as violative of the First Amendment because the sentenc-
ing court had considered the fact that he was a minister when he committed his fraudu-
lent acts to be an aggravating factor. United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740-41
(4th Cir. 1991).
209. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments very specifically set forth the characteristics
considered crucial to a fair criminal justice system. Although the word was known and
used in the Constitution, most of the protections at the criminal stage are not confined
to a criminal "trial." The language is actually quite broad, referring to being "held to
answer," the "criminal case" and "criminal prosecutions." The Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... ; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law ....
U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
210. As Professor Tonry phrased it: "Real offense sentencing side-steps the substan-
tive law as if its refinements are so much superfluous metaphysic, rather than the exact-
ingly developed fine print of the social contract." Tonry, supra note 2, at 1565. See
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 324-30, 347-49 (Peter Laslett ed.,
student ed. 1988) (3d. ed. 1698).
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This choice is critical even assuming, as McMillan posits, that it is
within a legislature's discretion to categorize conduct as a sentenc-
ing factor, an element of a crime, or a completely separate crime.211
Once the decision is made to condemn specific conduct as, in and of
itself, criminally reprehensible, a conviction must be treated as a
prerequisite to punishment based on that conduct.
The Court's analysis begs the crucial question-it presumes the
right to punish on proof of factual guilt. But the state's power to
punish does not derive from the existence of factual guilt; it
originates from the finding of legal guilt symbolized by conviction.
At its most elementary level, the criminal justice system exists to
legitimize punishment-to authorize the state to deprive an individ-
ual of his life, liberty, or property. Conviction supplies this legiti-
macy. Such legal guilt authorizes punishment even in the face of
factual innocence. American society clearly abhors the idea that an
innocent should be hanged, but in spite of this institutionalized ab-
horrence, government is not deemed to have acted lawlessly by pun-
ishing a factually innocent citizen after a fair trial and conviction. 21 2
Considered from this perspective, the fallacy in the reasoning up-
holding punishment for acquittal conduct becomes obvious. These
cases argue that an acquittal does not prove innocence. A citizen,
however, does not need to prove his innocence to protect himself
from criminal punishment; the government needs authorization
through conviction to legitimize his incarceration. 213 In the ab-
sence of a conviction, the government lacks constitutional authority
to exact punishment for allegedly criminal conduct. 214
211. Professor Herman takes issue with the idea that McMillan leaves states com-
pletely free to allocate conduct between elements and sentencing factors. Herman,
supra note 2, at 333-36.
212. Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976) (societal benefit warrants
finding prosecutor absolutely immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claim of having
knowingly presented perjured testimony at trial); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S 547, 553-54
(1967) (finding judge immune from damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even though
the judge was accused of acting maliciously or corruptly on ground that immunity bene-
fits public interest in having independent judiciary).
213. Cf. Herman, supra note 27, at 530 (The state "can no more create freedom
than [it can] life," thus, "under the Constitution, the role of the sovereign in connection
with freedom and liberty is purely negative.") (footnote omitted).
214. In fact, it is arguable that the notions of individual liberty embraced by the Bill
of Rights suggest that criminal conduct is the only legitimate action for which the state
may exact punishment. Under such a theory, fidelity to the offense of conviction is
required because any conduct not specifically proscribed by statute (or common law
crime) is deemed free conduct by this society. Other harmful conduct is relegated to the
civil system for settlement by damages or to other social means of control. Such an
approach would of course be inconsistent with the rehabilitative model as a whole. At
1222 [Vol. 40:1179
FEDERAL SENTENCING
The constitutional necessity of a conviction is most easily
grasped by examining the disruptive effects of the opposite pre-
sumption on the administration of justice through the classic jury
trial model. The prevailing approach emasculates the jury's ability
to protect the citizen from government overreaching, thereby un-
dermining the jury's crucial balancing role in the criminal justice
system. The judiciary's power to divine facts directly linked to pun-
ishment, as well as the United States Attorneys' capacity to secure
extreme punishment outside the trial context, is virtually uninhib-
ited. 215 Treating conviction as irrelevant to the right to punish
criminal behavior renders the jury powerless to control government
recourse to the criminal sanction. Abandoning jury approval un-
dercuts the stability of the criminal justice system by impugning the
integrity of the verdict, and by interfering with the jury's unique
ability to provide political accountability to the larger democratic
society.
B. The Example of the Jury Trial
The Constitution strikes a deliberate, yet precarious, balance
between the judge, jury,216 and prosecutor, each providing a coun-
terbalance to the potential abuses of the others. Any one actor
alone is empowered to exercise mercy by halting the process toward
conviction without the acquiescence of the other two: the prosecu-
tion may refuse to indict and neither the judiciary nor the grand
jury may override that decision; 217 the judge may dismiss the indict-
the very least, when the Constitution goes to the trouble to enumerate certain behaviors
and how or whether they may be punished, we should respect those statements.
215. The following argument does not seek to prove that government overreaching
is in fact the norm under a real offense model. Rather, it is designed to show that the
potential for abuse of power exists under the current system, and that the Guidelines
render the grand and petit juries powerless to check such abuse should the need arise.
216. Unless otherwise specified, references to the "jury" or "jury system" are in-
tended to encompass both the grand and petit juries in the federal system.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (noting that the
decision to prosecute rests exclusively in the Executive Branch); United States v. Cox,
342 F.2d 167, 185-96 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (pointing out that neither the
grand jury nor the judiciary may contravene the executive's decision not to indict), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). The Fifth Amendment theoretically gives the grand jury
the right to proceed against a defendant by presentment; however, at the time the Fifth
Amendment was adopted, the prosecutor possessed an unreviewable right to abort the
case by filing a writ of nolleprosequi. ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICI-
ARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 12 (1981). FED. R.
CRIM. P. 7(a) authorizes prosecution only pursuant to indictment (or information if
indictment is waived), thus eliminating the federal grand jury's right to proceed by
presentment.
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ment or order judgment of acquittal absent agreement of either the
jury or the prosecution;218 and the grand jury may refuse to indict
in spite of the government's insistence that the defendant should be
prosecuted,219 while a petit jury may decline to convict regardless of
the opinion of the judge or prosecutor.220 Contrast this with the
hurdles the government must overcome to secure criminal punish-
ment: the prosecutor must have both the approval of the grand jury
and the judge to pursue the indictment 221 and the approval of both
the judge and petit jury for a conviction. Thus, while independent
government agents may exercise mercy absent democratic approval,
decisions to institute proceedings or authorize punishment require
the explicit blessing of the "people" through the jury. 222
The architects of this plan did not expect that jury approval
would be lightly given. The jury was no accident of history or sym-
bolic offering designed to assuage the suspicions of the masses.
"[T]he American colonies won their independence at a time when
the jury system was being acclaimed as a fundamental guarantor of
individual liberty. '223 Colonists firmly believed that layperson ju-
218. If the judge dismisses the indictment, the prosecution is free to try again by
securing an indictment for the same offense from a different grand jury. See 2 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.2 (1984). In the case
of a judgment of acquittal, however, the defendant is theoretically immune by virtue of
the Double Jeopardy Clause from further criminal sanction for that conduct. United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975) (noting that "[w]hen a defendant has been
acquitted of an offense, the [Double Jeopardy] Clause guarantees that the State shall not
be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him").
219. The grand jury may not be compelled by either the prosecution or the judiciary
to return an indictment. See 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 218, § 15.2. The prose-
cution is free, however, to submit the evidence to the next grand jury in the hope of
obtaining an indictment. Professors LaFave and Israel point out that the "longstanding
federal rule" permits resubmission even though the prosecutor presents no additional
evidence to the second grand jury. See id.; see also, 1 SARA S. BEALE & WILLIAM C.
BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:41 (1986) (noting that "double jeop-
ardy imposes no bar to resubmission because the grand jury has determined only that
the evidence presented did not establish probable cause to indict the accused").
220. The petit jury's power to refuse to convict is absolute. See Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (even decision of "lawless" decisionmaker cannot be
reviewed). Although the trial court may direct a judgment of acquittal, it may never
direct a judgment of conviction. See, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1 (student ed. 1985).
221. The judge may review the indictment to ensure that a crime has been alleged
and for pleading inconsistencies, which if found may warrant dismissal. See LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 220, § 8.4(c). The review at common law was extremely strict. See
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 30-31 (1968).
222. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1184-85 (1991).
223. STIMSON, supra note 17, at 34.
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ries were the major impediment to the tyranny of arbitrary govern-
ment.224 As Justice Story's oft-quoted description explains:
It was from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the
parent country, as the great bulwark of their civil and political
liberties, and watched with an unceasing jealousy and solicitude.
... When our more immediate ancestors removed to America,
they brought this great privilege with them, as their birthright
and inheritance, as part of that admirable common law, which
had fenced round and interposed barriers on every side against
the approaches of arbitrary power. 225
The drafters of the Constitution, steeped in this tradition, placed the
jury at the heart of the criminal justice system with the expectation
that it would play an active and important role in safeguarding
American liberty. 226
224. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 21-29 (1951). As evidence of early America's regard for the
jury system, Heller notes that the denial of jury trial was one of the grievances specifi-
cally set forth in the Declaration of Independence, that every state boasted a constitu-
tional right to trial by jury before the adoption of the federal constitution, and that the
rhetoric used by constitutional critics during the ratification debates to praise the insti-
tution of the jury was extremely expansive. Id.
225. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1779, at 652-53 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).
226. See Amar, supra note 222, at 1183 ("The dominant strategy to keep agents of
the central government under control was to use the populist and local institution of the
jury.").
To adequately understand the significance of the jury in the constitutional frame-
work, one must first recognize that, unlike the modern judiciary, the drafters of the
Constitution were not engaged in a metaphysical debate about the meaning of a crimi-
nal conviction and its relationship to punishment. Conviction and punishment were
synonymous. "[W]ith few exceptions, criminal sentencing in the colonial period fol-
lowed a strict legislative model. Statutes dictated relatively fixed sentences-the whip,
the stocks, fines, death. Although magistrates sometimes had a modicum of discretion
concerning the duration of corporal punishments, for the most part, the system was
characterized by inflexibility." ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 84 (1976)
(footnote omitted). Although imprisonment gained steady popularity shortly after the
Constitutional Convention, id. at 85-87, it was against this backdrop of clear, legisla-
tively determined punishments that the drafters constitutionalized the criminal justice
system. The Constitution addressed the need to control government recourse to the
criminal sanction, not simply recourse to the criminal trial. See David Rothman, Law-
ful Sentences: How Much, in JUSTICE IN SENTENCING 46-52 (Leonard Orland & Har-
old R. Tyler eds., 1974); Herbert Wechsler, The Model Penal Code and the Codification
ofAmerican Criminal Law, in CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 419 (Roger
Hood ed., 1975); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81
HARV. L. REV. 821, 821-22 (1968). But see Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform
and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive"
Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 555 (1978) (taking issue with Dershowitz's (and
others') conclusion that judicial discretion in sentencing is the result of the optimism of
the Progressive Era). According to Professor Alschuler, the number of state statutes
vesting judges with the authority to choose punishment levels (branding, whipping, and
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Concerned that the meager provision for criminal trial by jury
in Article III might be insufficient to hold the government in
check,227 the first Congress designed more explicit methods in the
Bill of Rights by which the jury might control both the executive
and the independent judiciary of the national government. 228 The
right to indictment by grand jury was added both as a means of
controlling prosecutorial charging discretion and ensuring citizen
in some cases incarceration) during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries proves
that rehabilitation "has been neither the exclusive nor the primary impetus for the grant
ofjudicial sentencing discretion in America." Id. at 556. Alschuler suggests that "[t]he
principal function of judicial sentencing discretion has probably been to permit a de-
tailed consideration of differences of this sort in culpability-a consideration that legis-
latures have historically recognized their own inability to provide." Id. at 557. This
conclusion does not, however, support the notion that the framers understood separate
crimes for which a defendant had never been convicted to be within the realm of the
judge's sentencing discretion.
227. Article III provides only that "[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said
Crimes shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. This provision
provided the source of passionate attacks on the Constitution during the ratification
debates. See HELLER, supra note 224, at 25-29. These concerns were not limited to the
petit jury. As Richard D. Younger points out, "[t]he necessity of an express guarantee
of the right to indictment by a grand jury in all criminal cases became a disputed issue
before several of the state ratifying conventions." RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEO-
PLE'S PANEL 45 (1963). In Massachusetts, Abraham Holmes warned that officers of
the federal government would be at liberty to proceed by information and "bring any
man to jeopardy of his life without indictment by a grand jury." Id. Supporters of the
Constitution noted that the possibility of such behavior existed under the current draft,
but that just because officials could so abuse their power did not mean they necessarily
would. "Refusing to rely solely upon the integrity of future federal officials, the Massa-
chusetts [and New York and New Hampshire ratifying] convention[s] recommended
that the Constitution be amended" to include a grand jury provision. Id.
228. Early Americans were only too aware of the awesome power of the criminal
sanction as a tool for political oppression. The most grisly punishments in England had
typically been inspired by antigovernment activity. Amar, supra note 222, at 1182. For
example, "[flor the crime of 'writing books and pamphlets,' the English lawyer William
Prynne's 'ears were first cut off by court order and ... subsequently, by another court
order,. . . his remaining ear stumps [were] gouged out while he was on a pillory.' " Id.(citing Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 870 (1960)). In addi-
tion, the American colonial period, like the English practice of that time, had been
characterized by punishments of extreme severity. As Professor Jay Sigler explains:
"'[I]f one were to mark out the period of greatest severity in modern English law, the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries would undoubtedly form the central area.' With
this condition extant on both sides of the Atlantic, the need of a countervailing protec-
tion must have been evident." Jay A. Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 283, 303 (1963) (quoting JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 117(2d ed. 1952)). Only after the Revolution did the states succumb to the influence of
Cesare Beccaria's 1764 treatise, On Crimes and Punishment, and begin to reject the
harsh criminal laws characterizing the earlier era. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 226, at
85-86.
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review of government wrongdoing. 229 To further control govern-
ment recourse to the criminal sanction, the Bill of Rights included
the Double Jeopardy Clause.230 Although it makes "no explicit
mention of juries," Professor Akhil Amar argues that the Double
Jeopardy Clause "should be understood to safeguard not simply the
individual defendant's interest in avoiding vexation, but also the in-
tegrity of the initial petit jury's judgment (much like the Seventh
Amendment's rule against 're-examin[ation]' 23I of the civil jury's
verdict). ' 232 Also, in response to the widespread suspicion gener-
ated by the failure of Article III to require jurors from the neighbor-
229. The grand jury, hailed as a "bulwark against oppression," played an active role
in the Revolution by refusing to indict colonists for "political crimes" and in issuing
reports critical of England's colonial practices. YOUNGER, supra note 227, at 45-48.
230. Professor Jay Sigler credits Madison with the idea of including the Double
Jeopardy Clause, which when proposed in the House of Representatives on June 8,
1789, read as follows: "[N]o person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment or trial for the same offense." Sigler, supra note 228, at 304,
306. Although some members of the House thought the language might be interpreted
to deny the defendant a second trial after a successful appeal, id. at 305, the amendment
was presented to the Senate in the same form. The proposal was adopted by the Senate
with the substitution "be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb by any public prosecu-
tion." Id. at 306.
231. The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
232. Amar, supra note 222, at 1190 (alteration in original). The Article III jury
provision provoked intense criticism during ratification for offering no protection
against judicial disregard of the jury's verdict. See HELLER, supra note 224, at 25.
These critics "pointed to the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts and predicted
that it would, 'in its operation, destroy the trial by jury. The verdict of an impartial jury
will be reversed by judges unacquainted with the circumstances.' " Id. (quoting Patrick
Henry, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 3 THE DE-
BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 540 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott 1888)). What
protection could the jury really offer if its verdict could be upset by the independent
federal judiciary? Quite clearly, the Seventh Amendment prohibition against reconsid-
ering facts responds to this concern in the context of the civil jury. It seems odd to
assume that a nation obsessed with controlling the power of the central government and
its recourse to the criminal law would have been content to allow factual reconsidera-
tion in the context of the criminal trial, but not the civil. The Double Jeopardy Clause,
however, has never been interpreted to prohibit use of nonconviction offenses at sen-
tencing, nor has it been extended to prohibit an enhanced punishment when the defend-
ant has been convicted of other offenses prior to the instant offense. See infra note 253
and accompanying text.
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hood of the accused,233 the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the local
character of the jury.2 3 4
These fortifications to the jury system take on special signifi-
cance when one considers that jury nullification was a popular tool
by which English and colonial juries shielded their citizens from
government tyranny. 235 Requiring local jurors and ensuring the in-
violacy of "not guilty" verdicts236 increased the likelihood that a
jury would resort to nullification to resist abusive prosecutions.
Also recall that the right of jury review-the power to refuse to
enforce unconstitutional laws (as opposed to the right to disregard a
law altogether)-was widely advocated by early constitutional theo-
rists.237 The impeachment of Justice Chase for his refusal to in-
struct the jury regarding its power to review for unconstitutionality
supplies a graphic illustration of the strength of this belief.238 Con-
sidered against this backdrop, the drafters doubtless expected the
jury to provide a powerful defense against the overzealous prosecu-
tor and the corrupt judge239 and perhaps against abuses by the na-
tional lawmaking power as well. The Court's approach to
sentencing, however, demonstrates that this confidence was mis-
placed. The failure to treat conviction as a prerequisite to punish-
ment obviates the government's need to secure democratic approval
through jury review, thus eviscerating the jury's ability to control
executive and judicial abuse.
233. HELLER, supra note 224, at 25. During debate at the Virginia ratifying con-
vention, Patrick Henry declared: "[T]his great privilege ... is prostrated by this paper.
Juries from the vicinage being not secured, this right is in reality sacrificed." Id.; see
also Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine,
Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 508 (1986).
234. The Sixth Amendment mandates that jurors be drawn from the "State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
235. Regarding the English practice of nullification, see generally THOMAS A.
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 26-27, 62-63 (1985); TWELVE GOOD
MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL JURY IN ENGLAND 1200-1800 (J.S. Cockburn &
Thomas A. Green eds., 1988). Regarding both the history of the American experience
with jury nullification and whether the petit jury has the right or merely the power to
nullify, see generally Gary J. Stimson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A
Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REV. 488 (1976); Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullifi-
cation and Jury-Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (1990).
236. See infra text accompanying notes 257-58.
237. Amar, supra note 222, at 1191; see Massaro, supra note 233, at 508-09.
238. Amar, supra note 222, at 1191-92.
239. The Supreme Court has long praised the jury as a "safeguard against the cor-
rupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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1. Grand Jury Control
The tenuous control historically exercised over the United
States Attorneys' offices by the grand jury system is weakened even
further by the current real offense scheme. The grand jury is often
likened to a "shield" between the government and the accused by
virtue of its right to refuse to indict should it find the government's
evidence insufficient or unjust.24° Under the Guidelines, however,
the prosecution need not subject all criminal conduct to grand jury
review; in many cases, the prosecutor retains the option of obtaining
an equivalent criminal sanction by withholding evidence until after
trial and offering it at the much more relaxed sentencing hearing.
Not only does the possibility exist that a grand jury might not have
been willing to indict the defendant for criminal conduct introduced
at sentencing, but more disturbing, it might have already so de-
clined. The current system does not technically prevent a federal
prosecutor from presenting evidence of a "crime" at sentencing that
has already been offered to, and rejected by, the indicting grand
jury.241 Severing punishment from conviction not only frees the
federal prosecutor from the task of marshalling credible evidence to
obtain an indictment for additional criminal conduct, but poten-
tially authorizes her to ignore grand jury findings that such evi-
dence was insufficient, or even politically motivated.
242
240. The "grand jury is often said to operate as 'the shield and the sword' of the
criminal justice system." The grand jury acts as a "sword" by virtue of its ability to
operate as an investigatory body. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 220, at 346. The
efficacy of grand jury review has long been the subject of debate. Critics allege that the
grand jury is little more than the rubber stamp of the prosecutor. LaFave and Israel
quote former prosecutors as stating that "a prosecutor, if he so desires, 'can indict any-
body, at any time, for almost anything before a grand jury.'" Id. at 618. Because the
"no-bills" or refusals to indict have been few and far between in the federal system, id.
at 618-19, critics claim that the grand jury provides little affirmative control on the
prosecution. Given, however, that the real offense system has obviated the need to sub-
mit a large number of criminal offenses to the grand jury for screening, it is impossible
to judge the true effectiveness of the grand jury as a "shield."
241. Although FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f) requires that the grand jury file a "no true
bill" with the federal magistrate presiding over the grand jury if it rejects the entire
prosecution proposed by the Assistant U.S. Attorney, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f), neither
the grand jury nor the prosecutor are required to disclose that proposed counts of an
indictment have been rejected. Anecdotal information suggests that the federal prose-
cutor confronted with grand jury recalcitrance on a count could simply redraft the in-
dictment, deleting that count, and resubmit it to the grand jury.
242. I am not suggesting that redrafting and resubmitting the indictment is common
practice among federal prosecutors. In fact, I feel relatively certain it is not. The focus
of this entire section is on unchecked power-I am suggesting that the power to redraft
and resubmit and still obtain punishment at sentencing exists in the current system.
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The ability to secure punishment absent grand jury review un-
dermines the traditional notice function of the indictment. 24 Theo-
retically, an indictment ensures proper notice of a "capital, or
otherwise infamous crime" for which a defendant might be "held to
answer."' 24 4  Supreme Court lore suggests that the indictment
should "sufficiently apprise the defendant 'of what he must be pre-
pared to meet.' "245 Practically speaking, permitting punishment in
the absence of charge and conviction produces indictments that
provide little actual notice of the extent of criminal activity for
which a defendant may ultimately be held accountable. Because
federal indictments only detail the offense to be proven at trial, a
defendant may be "held to answer" for substantial additional crimi-
nal conduct at sentencing. 246
243. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 220, at 711. A complicated set of
rules designed to ensure notice exists, limiting the government's right to amend the
indictment in the absence of grand jury approval, regulating the level of variance be-
tween the evidence introduced at trial and the allegations of the indictment, and reaf-
firming the necessity of pleading certain facts in support of the elements of the crime.
See generally id. at 615-46. Quite clearly, the incentive to secure an amendment to the
indictment is minimal in cases in which sentence enhancements for uncharged offenses
will roughly equal punishments prescribed for such offenses upon conviction. It seems
odd that we are so concerned that the government be prevented from introducing infor-
mation of unindicted crimes or securing convictions for unindicted crimes at trial, yet
completely unconcerned that proof of these same crimes is offered at sentencing under
conditions designed to ensure that the government prevails and the defendant is pun-
ished for these crimes.
244. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
245. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962) (citations omitted).
246. The current approach confines the requisite notice to information to which one
might be expected to respond at trial, thus excluding accusations raised at sentencing
from the indictment requirement. The words "at trial" do not, however, follow the
words "held to answer" in the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Moreover,
the drafters of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were specific at other points, restricting
the privilege against self-incrimination to "criminal case[s]" and extending trial by jury
to situations involving "criminal prosecutions." Id. amend. VI. History is similarly
unavailing in confirming that the indictment requirement was inextricably linked to
crimes the prosecutor hoped to prove at trial, rather than crimes for which the govern-
ment sought punishment. In the late eighteenth century, the words "held to answer"
may have referred to answers given to questions from the magistrate (which predated
police interrogations) or perhaps to the formal plea to criminal charges at an arraign-
ment-like proceeding. Either historical hypothesis supports the view that a defendant is
being "held to answer" at the sentencing hearing when the government introduces fac-
tual information in support of accusations of extraneous criminal behavior in an effort
to secure additional punishment for that behavior. A failure to object on the defend-
ant's part is treated as agreement; if a defendant hopes to avoid jail time for such con-
duct, he must object and cast enough doubt on government evidence to bring it below
the preponderance of the evidence level.
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Consider the case of United States v. Kikumura,247 in which
the government indicted and obtained conviction for twelve pass-
port and weapons violations. 248 The unindicted and unconvicted
conduct introduced at sentencing increased the defendant's sentence
ten-fold. 249 Yet the federal prosecutor was under no obligation to
include that information in the indictment. For the most part, the
federal courts have responded to the notice claim like other consti-
tutional challenges-noting that the defendant received notice of
criminal conduct proven at trial; because he is not being punished
for other criminal conduct, the notice function is not implicated.
One federal court has even suggested that the Guidelines themselves
provide the requisite notice. 250 The same could be said of the entire
federal criminal code, but to date no one has suggested that the
conduct sought to be proven at trial need not be described by the
indictment.251
Another key role traditionally ascribed to indictment by grand
jury is to provide a record by which double jeopardy claims might
247. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
248. Id. at 1093-94. The court of appeals noted that the most serious violation was
of 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (Supp. I 1990), which prohibits transportation of explosives in
interstate commerce "with the knowledge or intent that it will be used to kill, injure, or
intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or
real or personal property." Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1094.
249. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1100. Although the Guidelines provided a sentencing
range of 27 to 33 months for the offense of conviction, Kikumura was sentenced to 360
months. Id. at 1089. The sentencing judge departed from the Guidelines because he
found that Kikumura was a member of the Japanese Red Army international terrorist
organization, that he "meticulously planned, schemed and attempted" to carry out a
terrorist mission in the United States, and that he intended to kill scores of people with
his bombs "for no reason other than they are Americans." Id. at 1097. The judge
equated this activity to attempted murder in calculating the sentence. Id. at 1115.
Although the Third Circuit recognized a difference between an intent to commit mur-
der and an attempt to commit murder, it found the analogy to attempted murder rea-
sonable. Id. The Third Circuit reviewed each factor listed by the sentencing judge as a
reason for departure and concluded that, while 360 months was an unreasonable sen-
tence, 262 months would not be unreasonable. Id. at 1089.
250. United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 266-67 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that, by
defining "specific and finite factors" used to adjust the sentence, "the [G]uidelines them-
selves provide notice to the defendant" about what factors he should be prepared to
comment on at the sentencing hearing).
251. Most notice claims arise in the context of FED. R. CRIM. P. 32. Yet, notice of
criminal accusations via presentence reports are at base unsatisfactory. The opportu-
nity to defend criminal charges first introduced at sentencing is substantially diminished
from the trial context. See supra text accompanying notes 110-18. Timing and possi-
bility of success (in that it is essentially an affirmative defense situation) conspire to
undermine the ability to marshal a defense. In addition, the lower procedural due pro-
cess requirements do not even mandate a full evidentiary hearing in which to respond to
every accusation withheld until sentencing.
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be judged. 252 Again, the Guidelines' real offense scheme permits a
prosecutor to avoid the constraints of the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion by the simple expedient of not bothering to charge the crime.
Under the Guidelines, a prosecutor may secure punishment for an
uncharged offense at sentencing, only to turn around the following
day and present that offense to a new grand jury. The Double Jeop-
ardy Clause will find fault neither with the subsequent indictment
and trial nor, as recent cases demonstrate, with a second punish-
ment for that offense. 253 Although the Supreme Court recently re-
affirmed that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects "against
multiple punishments for the same offense, ' '254 the federal courts do
not interpret this language to preclude prosecution for conduct that
has been the basis of an enhancement under the Guidelines. As the
Eleventh Circuit recently explained:
Enhancement of a sentence based on criminal conduct other than
that underlying the instant conviction has the practical effect of
penalizing the defendant for that conduct. However, it is not
considered "punishment" for that conduct in the double jeop-
ardy context because the court is sentencing the defendant only
for the instant offense, which is considered more serious because
of the defendant's other criminal conduct. 255
252. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 220, at 711.
253. See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 938 F.2d 678, 679-80 (6th Cir. 1991) (agreeing
with the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits that "the prohibition against double jeop-
ardy is not implicated when a defendant is indicted for an incident of conduct previ-
ously used to increase the length of his sentence for a separate offense"); United States
v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 881, 886 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[C]onsideration of a prior bad act at
sentencing will not ordinarily create a double jeopardy bar to a later prosecution for
that bad act."). But see United States v. McCormick, 798 F. Supp. 203, 206-07 (D. Vt.
1992) (relying on the Double Jepardy Clause to dismiss several counts of an indictment
for criminal conduct that had been used to support a 13-level sentence enhancement in a
previous prosecution).
254. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516 (1990) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
255. United States v. Carey, 943 F.2d 44, 46 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1676 (1992). The Carey court noted that this explanation is the same as that used
to explain the constitutionality of the use of prior convictions to enhance a sentence.
The question of whether criminal conduct for which a conviction has been secured may
be used to mandate a higher sentence for a subsequent crime is beyond the scope of this
Article. It may be, however, that a better explanation for the acceptability of heavier
sentences for previously convicted defendants lies with the language of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause itself. "Life.or limb" refers to the English practice of sentencing an of-
fender to death or mutilation upon proof of a second crime. The double jeopardy
concept developed in England to ensure that such punishment was only meted out upon
proof of a different crime than that for which the first punishment was given. See gener-
ally Sigler, supra note 228. Arguably, the Constitution presumes that sentences for
second offenders will be more severe for a given crime.
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It is the failure to require democratic review in the first instance
that gives rise to the ease with which the prosecution may avoid the
strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause.256
2. Petit Jury Control
Punishment absent conviction also skews the power relation-
ship between the federal prosecutor and the petit jury. By insisting
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt and through the implicit threat
of nullification, the federal petit jury was expected to provide a
strong check to potential prosecutorial abuse. But under the Guide-
lines, the prosecutor will often see no need to take up the challenge
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial because informa-
tion introduced informally at sentencing may yield an identical or
satisfactory punishment for the criminal conduct at issue. In addi-
tion, to the extent that the jury, through the Sixth Amendment
"district" requirement, was intended to provide community over-
sight of the United States Attorney, such oversight is lost.2 57 A
jury's refusal to convict should send a strong message to the execu-
tive regarding community tolerance for certain types of crime and
even of certain classes of offenders. Yet, the Guidelines insulate the
United States Attorney from this risk of rebellion, thereby interfer-
ing with the community's ability to influence the direction of her
law enforcement decisions. Even in cases where the jury is given
the opportunity to consider evidence of the defendant's criminality,
it is stripped of absolute authority to exercise mercy. If acquittal
conduct falls within a Guidelines category rendering it relevant to
the offense of conviction, a prosecutor will likely encounter no im-
pediment to having that conduct "counted" at sentencing. 258 Thus,
the theoretical checks provided by the burden of proof and the risk
of jury rebellion are simply that-theoretical.
The sheer amount of fact-finding power potentially residing
with the federal judiciary also suggests that the current system is at
odds with the jury's central role in the constitutional plan for the
administration of criminal justice. Colonists possessed a deep dis-
trust of the judiciary due to their harsh treatment at the hands of
256. Professor Herman argues in the context of acquittal offenses that the double
jeopardy values of protecting defendants from the anxiety of a second trial and of
prohibiting the prosecutor from perfecting her case through practice are both impli-
cated by the relitigation of facts at sentencing. Herman, supra note 2, at 351.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 233-34.
258. See cases cited supra note 253.
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the British judges, 259 and it was through the jury that they expected
to control the power of the independent federal judiciary. 26° Be-
cause the power of the American judiciary has in no way dimin-
ished since 1791, there is little reason to suspect that the need to
control that power has become obsolete.
The current system creates just the sort of opportunities for
judges to abuse power that the Constitution sought to avoid. The
power of the trial court to find facts crucial to the amount of pun-
ishment is, for all intents and purposes, unchecked-appellate re-
view of findings of fact continues to be extremely circumscribed (or
nonexistent). 261 Consider, for example, the colloquy following a
district court's decision to enhance a defendant's sentence for pos-
session of a firearm even though the jury had acquitted on that
count:
THE COURT: The jury could not have made-the jury could not
have listened to the instructions.
COUNSEL: Your Honor,-
THE COURT: The testimony was so strong. The gun was even
in the apartment. That's all they needed. There
was no dispute of that fact. The mere fact that
that gun was in the apartment, being used in
association with-he didn't have to have it on his
person.
COUNSEL: They perhaps didn't believe it was being used in
association with drug-related activity, your Honor.
259. See Amar, supra note 222, at 1185; see also Essays by a Farmer (IV) in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI FEDERALIST 39 (1981) ("Whenever therefore the trial by juries has
been abolished . . . [t]he judiciary power is immediately absorbed or placed under the
direction of the executive .... ) (cited in Amar, supra note 222, at 1185 n.238). The
views of Cesare Beccaria were extremely influential at this time. His treatise, On Crimes
and Punishments, also advocates more control of abusive judges. See CESARE BEC-
CARTA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 10-12 (David Young trans., Hackett 1986)
(6th ed. 1766).
Distrust of the judiciary did not prove unwarranted when considered in light of the
extremely partisan actions of some federalist judges during the Sedition Act era. See
JAMES M. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS 139-417 (1956); Amar, supra note 222, at
1185 n.239 (citing 2 GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATION OF POWER: JOHN MAR-
SHALL 1801-1805, at 140, 159 (1981)).
260. See Amar, supra note 222, at 1185 (noting that "in those aspects of a criminal
case that might involve a judge acting without a jury, [such as] issuing arrest warrants,
setting bail, and sentencing," the Bill of Rights provides additional restrictions on the
power of the judge).
261. Appellate review provides protection in only the most extreme cases because
review of facts found by the sentencing judge is based on a clearly erroneous standard.
18 U.S.C § 3742(d) (1988).
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THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you something; I have been
disappointed in jury verdicts before, but that's one
of the most important ones, because what it did, it
set up a disparity in result between the two
defendants. Your client was consistently selling
cocaine from his apartment and using a firearm.
The fact is that the officers came in and testified
that it was in your client's waistband and
described, had an officer on the stand, a man who
is an ATF agent, who is capable and knows what
a firearm looks like, telling them, "This is what I
saw."
There is no reason for him not to have seen
that, since its undisputed that the firearm was in
the apartment and it's undisputed that the firearm
was used in connection with drug sales and used
[for] the purpose of protecting drug sales. And
then here in number twelve, there is no doubt at
all that the firearm was brought for him. It's all a
pattern. This firearm was used. They had to
absolutely disregard the testimony of a
government agent for no reason-no reason.
COUNSEL: Perhaps they considered the testimony of the
other agent who testified that he couldn't be sure,
your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, you can take it up with an appellate court,
because I've made my findings on the record. 2 6 2
As noted earlier, the Fifth Circuit found nothing objectionable
about the judge's behavior. 263 Given that the current system ren-
ders the jury powerless to shield a defendant from even the simple
disagreement of the trial judge, the salutary promise of jury protec-
tion from the "biased or unscrupulous" judge appears empty in the
extreme.264
The Constitution entrusts to the jury, not to an independent
federal judge, the task of determining the "truth" of criminal accu-
sations. 265 That choice reflects both a distrust of judges and a rec-
ognition of the importance to the integrity of the system of avoiding
262. United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1989).
263. Id. at 749.
264. In addition to being able to nullify jury verdicts, the real offense model gives
the judge the power to nullify the prosecutor's right to exercise mercy. Under the
Guidelines, a prosecutor's decision not to charge a criminal act that falls within "rele-
vant conduct" or the like may be muted in its entirety should the probation report
disclose the uncharged, but relevant, conduct.
265. Professor Massaro suggests that:
The preference for laypersons' judgments may also stem from a distrust
of, or disinclination to rely exclusively on, lawyers' and judges' judg-
ments. As one of George Eliot's characters in Middlemarch observes,
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punishment based on inaccurate factual assessments. Twelve peo-
ple, each placing different emphasis on various bits of testimony,
remembering statements in different ways, and drawing different
conclusions from the demeanor of witnesses, can challenge and re-
fine each other's views. 266 If they are able to arrive at a unanimous
decision about "what happened," we feel more confident about their
conclusion than we do about the conclusion of one individual who
has seen many criminal trials, knows the prosecutor personally, and
has the inevitable biases that come with power and experience.
Punishing a defendant for criminal conduct determined by a single
judge flies in the face of this reasoning. 267
3. Safeguarding the Jury Role
Absent some method of forcing the government to submit to
jury oversight, the criminal system collapses in on itself. Under the
current regime of nonconviction offense sentencing, only the judge
and prosecutor need approve the bulk of punishment decisions-the
inherent balance provided by democratic input through the jury is
all but lost. Sanctioning jury evasion undermines more than merely
democratic ability to check potential executive and judicial abuses,
it endangers the crucial link provided by the jury between the crimi-
nal justice system and the larger democratic society. The jury rep-
resents the collective conscience of the community.268 A finding of
guilt by the community gives validity to the sanction; it adds a spe-
cial and irreplaceable dimension of fairness to the deprivation of an
"In my opinion .... legal training only makes a man more incompetent
in questions that require knowledge of another kind."
Massaro, supra note 233, at 511 n.70 (quoting GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH 168
(The Folio Society 1972)).
266. The Supreme Court has observed that such group fact-finding produces "dif-
fused impartiality." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (quoting Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). As Professor
Massarro explains, "[t]he need for diffused impartiality stems from the heterogeneity of
society, and hence of perceptions, and from the realization that no person is really 'im-
partial.' " Massaro, supra note 233, at 511.
267. The present sentencing system suggests that we do not really believe that the
fact-finding abilities of the jury are superior to those of the court in the criminal context.
If that is so, we should rethink the use of the criminal jury in its entirety rather than
employ it arbitrarily. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 180-81
(1930) ("The jury makes the orderly administration of justice impossible."). But see
Massaro, supra note 233, at 510-11 (juries serve interests beyond efficient fact-finding).
268. See PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 21 (1984) ("In a sense, the jury
achieves symbolically what cannot be achieved practically-the presence of the entire
populace at every trial."); Massaro, supra note 233, at 512 ("The jury interjects commu-
nity conscience into the process, if only symbolically.").
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individual's liberty.269 By codifying the use of nonconviction of-
fenses, the Guidelines' real offense scheme exudes contempt for the
necessity of democratic approval, thus frustrating, rather than rein-
forcing, public confidence in the system.270
The American system of criminal justice can ill afford a further
diminution in prestige. In recent decades, it has been denounced as
arbitrary by all sides, too lenient, and too harsh, not to mention
racist, classist, and sexist. Even assuming the unimpeachable integ-
rity of the vast majority of prosecutors and judges, the stability of
the criminal justice system demands that we honor the structure
designed to counteract the potential abuse of the unscrupulous gov-
ernment official.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the Guidelines' non-
conviction offense regime dislodges the jury from its crucial over-
sight role in the criminal justice system. This is no trivial disruption
requiring only a minor adjustment in our approach to sentencing.
The jury system lies at the heart of the Bill of Rights. The demon-
strable incongruity between the prevailing due process analysis and
the crucial role of the jury requires the wholesale rejection of non-
conviction offense sentencing. Conviction must be treated as a pre-
requisite to punishment regardless of the method used to dispose of
the criminal case-thus, even in the plea bargain context, 271 the
269. See Massaro, supra note 233, at 513-14; Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the
Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357,
1364 (1985).
270. See Freed, supra note 2, at 1714 ("Ironically, the relevant conduct guideline
reduces visibility and candor in sentencing.").
271. The fact that nearly 90% of federal convictions are obtained by guilty plea, see
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1909 n.1 (1992), in no way undermines the importance of abandoning nonconviction
offense sentencing. A guilty plea is only a waiver of one's right to have legal guilt
assessed by a petit jury. It does not affect the Fifth Amendment right to accusation by
indictment, nor can it be interpreted as a wholesale surrender of other constitutional
restraints on the government's recourse to the criminal sanction. Treating a guilty plea
as conferring anything beyond the right to punish a defendant for the crime admitted
lodges with the government just the sort of hidden, unchecked power that the Constitu-
tion steadfastly sought to avoid.
In addition, other factors weigh in favor of treating the jury model as the norm
when gauging the constitutionality of sentencing practices. First, the framers of the
Constitution unquestionably assumed that the jury trial would be the primary method
by which guilt and conviction were secured. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining
and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-24 (1979) (explaining that guilty pleas were
not typical 200 years ago, but were rather viewed with hostility). Demonstrable incom-
patibility with this system does not lose its constitutional significance simply because we
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government must charge all criminal offenses for which it seeks to
obtain punishment. 272 Absent formal accusation and conviction en-
tered after trial, or a formal plea of guilty, the government lacks the
constitutional authority to exact punishment for that offense.
This conclusion requires only that the nonconviction offense be
excluded from the sentencing inquiry;273 it says nothing about the
power of the legislature to repeal criminal statutes and relegate that
conduct to the sentencing context, 274 nor about the applicability of
the Due Process Clause to factors properly considered at the sen-
tencing hearing. 275 Yet, even by taking the limited step of excising
the nonconviction offense from the medley of legitimate sentencing
factors, a modicum of harmony is injected into modem sentencing
practice. 276 We discard the punishment-enhancement fiction and
restore an acquittal to its commonly understood status. The plea
have chosen to treat the waiver of jury trial rights as a desirable and necessary evil.
Second, plea bargaining is the stepchild of the jury system-the Constitution does not
enshrine plea bargaining in the Bill of Rights. In fact, a substantial debate continues to
rage about both the right to waive jury trial in the first instance, see Amar, supra note
222, at 1196-99, and the legitimacy of plea bargaining. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler,
Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargain-
ing System, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 931, 932-36 (1983).
272. As explained earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 121-26, nonconviction
offenses were incorporated as sentencing factors in an effort to dampen the effects of
prosecutorial charging decisions. Though a conviction offense system may give prose-
cutors more control over sentence length, concerns about disparities created by
prosecutorial discretion are better confronted directly than surreptitiously through a
real offense sentencing model. See generally Alschuler, supra note 121 (calling for the
elimination of plea bargaining in presumptive systems coupled with a legislatively speci-
fied reward for entering a guilty plea); Schulhofer, Due Process at Sentencing, supra note
2, at 757-60, 820-21 (rejecting real offense model to control prosecutorial power and
suggesting judicial control of charge-reduction agreements); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1562-65 (1981) (advocating,
inter alia, guidelines for prosecutorial decision making).
273. Logically, "legally recognized" facts, that is, facts that form "elements of sub-
stantive offense definitions and constitute the basis for hierarchical distinctions between
offenses," Tonry & Coffee, supra note 2, at 155, must also be excluded from the sen-
tencing inquiry under my analysis. Thus, a prosecutor could not charge robbery (in-
stead of the more serious offense of armed robbery) and introduce evidence of use of a
firearm at sentencing. Doing so would allow the government to avoid jury scrutiny of
the armed robbery offense.
274. See generally Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable
Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1665 (1987).
275. See generally Herman, supra note 2, at 342-55.
276. Other commentators have persuasively advanced the policy reasons for re-jecting real offense sentencing. See generally Reitz, supra note 2, at 547-73; Schulhofer,
Due Process of Sentencing, supra note 2, at 765-72; Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penal-
ties, supra note 53, at 130-32 (rejecting real offense model on both policy and constitu-
tional grounds); Tonry & Coffee, supra note 2, at 152-63.
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bargain becomes less of a gamble and more of a bargain. 277 Also
the sentencing hearing itself becomes less factually complex, per-
haps allowing the judiciary to devote precious resources to other
proceedings.
Decades of sentencing reform have sought to re-establish re-
spect for a system veiled in secrecy and plagued with accusations of
arbitrariness. The Guidelines provide us with the opportunity to
complete this task; they provide a structure by which the validity of
long-held assumptions about the sentencing process may be re-eval-
uated. Scrutiny reveals that the expansive assumption about the
power to punish absent conviction, undergirding the Williams,
Grayson, and McMillan decisions, is flawed. A conviction is not
irrelevant to the right to punish a criminal offense; it is a
prerequisite.
277. Plea bargaining under the Guidelines has provoked dismay among judges,
scholars, and defendants. Defendants often receive no "bargain" if dropped counts are
considered relevant conduct yielding a sentence equivalent to that which they would
have received had they been convicted of both. E.g., United States v. Scroggins, 880
F.2d 1204, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1083 (1990). Professors Daniel
Freed and Marc Miller note that the "[relevant conduct] guideline system has a power-
ful capacity to undermine a defendant's reasonable expectations if the defense attorney
does not fully comprehend the extent to which non-binding charge and sentence bar-
gains may be trumped by relevant conduct at sentencing." Dan Freed & Marc Miller,
Plea Bargained Sentences, Disparity and "Guideline Justice," 3 FED. SENTENCING REP.
175, 177-78 (1991). Professors Freed and Miller recommend that a defense lawyer
never advise a client to plead guilty without control over relevant conduct information.
Id. In response, Professor Stephen Schulhofer attributes sentencing surprises in the
plea context to the judiciary's failure to comply with a policy statement "indicating that
the judge 'shall defer' the decision whether to accept a plea until after reading the PSI."
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Implementing the Plea Agreement Provisions of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 179, 179-81 (1991); see also Wilkins.
supra note 80, at 804.

